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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-Standard of Proof Required in a Delinquency Ad-
judication.--Appellant, a twelve-year old, was adjudged a juvenile delinquent
under the Family Court Act' on a finding that he had stolen $112 from the
victim's purse. The only evidence of the appellant's guilt wN-as provided by the
victim, with two witnesses testifying that the appellant was elsewhere at the
time of the incident. The family court judge based his finding of delinquency
on a fair preponderance of the evidence.2 The order was affirmed by the ap-
pellate division3 and an appeal was made to the court of appeals on the question
of the constitutionality of the standard of proof required by the N.Y. Family
Court Act § 744(b). 4 In a 4-3 decision, the court of appeals held that a "pre-
ponderance of evidence" was adequate to determine the status of delinquency for
an infant,5 even though the Code of Criminal Procedure requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt for the conviction of an adult." The United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally
required in the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding. In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
The juvenile court system in the United States is an outgrowth of the chancery
power as parens patriae to protect the child. 7 At first, courts only differentiated
in the disposition of adult and youthful offenders by committing minors to
reformatories rather than to prisons with adult criminals.8 In other respects the
children were treated in the same manner as adults. Around the turn of the
century, the guardianship principle of the court of chancery was extended to
encompass all children in need of the protection of the state, including delinquent
children.' After the establishment of the first juvenile court in Cook County,
Illinois, in 1899, 1 the juvenile court movement developed rapidly, and by 1967,
when In re Gault'- was decided, it was noted that every state had some special
machinery for dealing with juvenile offenders.' 3 However, the absence of con-
stitutional safeguards in such machinery often led to abuses.14 In Kent v. United
1. N.Y. Family Court Act, art. 7 (McKinney 1963).
2. See W. v. Family Court, 24 N.Y.2d 196, 206, 247 N.E2d 253, 260, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414,
423 (1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
3. In re W., 30 App. Div. 2d 781, 291 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Ist Dep't 196S).
4. N.Y. Family Court Act § 744(b) (McKinney 1963): "Any determination at the con-
clusion of an adjudicatory hearing .. . must be based on a preponderance of the evidence."
5. 24 N.Y.2d at 202-03, 247 N.E.2d at 257, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
6. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 389 (McKinney 1958).
7. In re Johnson, 178 F. Supp. 155, 161-62 (D.N.J. 1957); United States v. Fotto, 103
F. Supp. 430, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). See Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 104
(1909).
8. In re Knowack, 158 N.Y. 482, 487, 53 N.E. 676, 677 (1899).
9. Id.
10. See H. Lou, Juvenile Courts in the United States (1927).
11. E. Sutherland & D. Cressey, Principles of Criminology 398 (6th ed. 1960).
12. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
13. Id. at 14.
14. See The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society: A Report by the President's Con-
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States,15 the Supreme Court noted that in some jurisdictions the child receives
"the worst of both worlds . . . neither the protections accorded to adults nor
the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."' 0
Many state courts were conscious of these abuses to which juvenile courts
were susceptible and either found the statutes giving rise to such abuses uncon-
stitutional or interpreted their statutes in such a way as to avoid a finding of
unconstitutionality. 17 In 1962, New York's Family Court Act was revised in
response to constitutional theories that adjudications which threaten a youth
with incarceration should provide as many procedural safeguards as possible.18
The Act is premised on the concept that "[n] o adjudication under this article
may be denominated a conviction . ,19 Within this framework, the statute lists
in detail the necessary steps to be taken before a youth can be adjudged a de-
linquent, prescribing when and how an offender may be taken into custody,20
the nature of the preliminary, determinative and dispositional hearings,21 and
the machinery for rehearing.2 2 The statute permits only material and relevant
evidence to be considered,2 and provides that no adjudicated delinquent will
forfeit any rights or privileges because of such adjudication2 4 The express pur-
pose of the Article is to provide for due process of law in juvenile delinquency
hearings. 25 The Supreme Court, in Winship, pointed out that the application of
a reasonable doubt standard will not disturb the policy of such a statute; it
requires no change in the procedural differences of a delinquency adjudication. - "
The decision by the New York Court of Appeals, in W. v. Family Court,
typified the controversy raised over the quantum of proof required in a juvenile
delinquency adjudication since the Supreme Court decided In re Gault in 1967."7
mission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice ch. 3, at 83-88 (1967) [herein-
after cited as Commission Report].
15. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
16. Id. at 556. "There is much evidence that some juvenile courts .. . lack the personnel,
facilities and techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the State in a parens
patriae capacity, at least with respect to children charged with law violations." Id. at 555-56
(emphasis omitted).
17. The decisions are reviewed in 43 C.J.S. Infants §§ 93-102 (1945).
18. See W. v. Family Court, 24 N.Y.2d at 200-01, 247 N.E.2d at 256-57, 299 N.Y.S.2d at
418-19.
19. N.Y. Family Court Act § 781 (McKinney 1963).
20. Id. §§ 721, 724, 726, 729 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
21. Id. §§ 731, 736, 738, 741-46, 748.
22. Id. § 761.
23. Id. § 745 (McKinney 1963).
24. Id. § 782.
25. Id. § 711.
26. 397 U.S. at 366-67.
27. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The question had been considered in several states prior to the
Gault decision. Most courts had decided that the standard of proof required to determine
guilt in a delinquency proceeding was the same as the standard of proof required In an
ordinary civil action. Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1138-40 (1955). A few courts had held that an
adjudication of delinquency required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Madik, 233
App. Div. 12, 251 N.Y.S. 765 (3d Dept't 1931); In re Rich, 86 N.Y.S.2d 308 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
1949); Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946).
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Prior to 1966, the Supreme Court had not considered the constitutionality ofjuvenile court procedures.28 It was traditionally held that the due process safe-
guards applicable to criminal proceedings did not apply to proceedings in thejuvenile courts because such procedures were designed to rehabilitate and pro-
tect children rather than to punish them?9 Constitutional safeguards were ex-
cluded from juvenile proceedings because it was believed that their incorporation
would interfere with the informal and non-adversarial resolution of the child's
problems. ° But in Gault, the Supreme Court held that juvenile delinquency
hearings must measure up to the "'essentials of due process and fair treatment'
... which is part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of our
Constitution." 3' Gault, however, did not hold that all procedural guarantees
applicable to an adult in criminal proceedings must be applied to a juvenile
delinquency adjudicationna nor did it profess to consider the totality of the
relationship of the juvenile to the state.3 In emphasizing that its decision was
not to be read so as to eliminate the concept of special treatment for juveniles,
the Court said "the observance of due process standards, intelligently and not
ruthlessly administered, will not compel the States to abandon or displace any
of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process.134
As the various state courts did consider the question of whether due process
and fair treatment in a juvenile delinquency hearing required an infant's guilt
to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, two distinct interpretations of Gault
emerged. Those who would stiffen procedural requirements argued that Gault's
whole spirit pointed toward providing procedural safeguards in juvenile hearings
particularly where the child was faced with incarceration and the adjudication
for what, if not for his age, would be a criminal charge.3 5 These courts main-
tained that the "spirit... of Gadt transcends the specific issues there involved,
and that, in view thereof, it would not be consonant with due process or equal
28. The Supreme Court's first major decision in the area of juvenile court procedures
was Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
29. E.g., In re Perham, 104 N.H. 276, 184 A.2d 449 (1962).
30. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966). In Kent, the Court held that a
juvenile court may not waive jurisdiction and remand the defendant to the criminal courts
without first affording the defendant the basic requirements of due process, including a
hearing, assistance of counsel, and a statement of reasons for the court's decision.
31. 387 US. at 30-31 (footnotes omitted).
32. Id. at 10-11 n.7 and accompanying text. In Kent, while expressing its concern for
the juvenile offender, the Court commented that it was not "induce[d] ... in this case to
accept the invitation to rule that constitutional guaranties which would be applicable
to adults charged with the serious offenses... must be applied in juvenile court proceedings
concerned with allegations of law violation." 383 U.S. at 556 (footnote omitted).
33. 387 US. at 13.
34. Id. at 21 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the questions raised by Gault, see
-Arthur, Should Children Be as Equal as People?, 45 N.D.L. Rev. 204 (1969); Carver &
White, Constitutional Safeguards for the Juvenile Offender, 14 Crime & Delinquency 63
(1968) ; Ferster & Courtless, The Beginning of Juvenile Justice, Police Practices, and the
Juvenile Offender, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 567 (1969).
35. E.g, United States v. Costanzo, 395 F.2d 441 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 US. 883
(1968) ; In re Urbasek, 38 ]EL 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1968).
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protection to grant allegedly delinquent juveniles the same procedural rights that
protect adults charged with crimes, while depriving these rights of their full
efficacy by allowing a finding of delinquency upon a lesser standard of proof
than that required to sustain a criminal conviction."30 On the other side were
those courts which distinguished Gault on the grounds that the Court had
specifically refused to rule on the standard of proof issue.3 7 These courts held
that since the purpose of juvenile courts was to free youthful offenders from
the technicalities and consequences of criminal law, it was not an absence of
procedural due process to have one standard of proof for delinquency adjudica-
tions, which are non-criminal status determinations, and to have quite another
standard for criminal convictions.38
The Supreme Court in Winship responded to the "single, narrow question
whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the 'essentials of due process
and fair treatment' required during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is
charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult"38
with two distinct holdings. First, it held that in a criminal proceeding, "the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt,"'40 and second, it held that the reasonable doubt standard is
required at the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding. 41
There is no explicit reference in the Constitution to the standard of proof
required in criminal adjudications, and although the Supreme Court had never
previously held that the reasonable doubt standard was constitutionally re-
quired in state criminal cases,4 it has historically been accepted as such.43 The
36. In re Urbasek, 38 IMI. 2d at 541-42, N.E.2d at 719; see 72 Dick. L. Rev. 547
(1968).
37. E.g., In re M., 70 Cal. 2d 444, 450 P.2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969); In re Wylie,
231 A.2d 81 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967); State v. Arenas, 453 P.2d 915 (Ore. 1969); see In re
Whittington, 17 Ohio App. 2d 164, 245 N.E.2d 364 (1969). See also State v. Santana, 444
S.W.2d 614 (Tex. 1969), vacated and remanded for consideration in light of In re Winship,
397 U.S. 596 (1970).
38. A California court stated that "in the absence of a specific ruling on the Issue by
the United States Supreme Court, we adhere to the pre-Gault view of our courts that the
established standard is valid and 'No constitutional rights of the appellant have been
infringed by the use of the preponderance of evidence test to determine the truth of the
allegation that he had committed a crime.'" In re M., 70 Cal. 2d at 460, 450 P.2d at 305,
75 Cal. Rptr. at 10-11 (emphasis omitted). See also N.Y. Family Court Act § 781 (McKiCnney
1963), which states that delinquency status is not criminal and the proceedings are not
criminal.
39. 397 U.S. at 359 (1970).
40. Id. at 364.
41. Id. at 368; see Note, Quantum of Proof in Delinquency Hearings, 5 Willamette L.J.
149 (1968).
42. Dorsen & Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, I Family L.Q. 4,
26 (1967).
43. Historically, the standard of proof accepted in criminal cases has been "beyond a
reasonable doubt." In civil cases, a preponderance of the evidence has found acceptance.
Neither has a single accepted definition. See C. McCormick, Evidence § 321, at 681-82 (1954);
9 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2497, 2498, at 316, 317-18 (3d ed. 1940).
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Court pointed out that it had long been assumed in its own opinions that the
reasonable doubt standard was constitutionally required," allocating to that
standard a "vital role" in American criminal procedure. 5 The Court believed
that it is "a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on
factual error"46 and that it is the "concrete substance for the presumption of in-
nocence."4 7 The Court stated that "[1]est there remain any doubt about the
constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that
the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged."48
In determining what standard should be applied in delinquency adjudications,
the Supreme Court reviewed the arguments made by the majority in W. v.
Family Court.4 9 The Court of Appeals had held that the constitutionality of the
disputed section of the Family Court Act depended upon whether a delinquency
hearing was a criminal or civil proceeding. 0 It stated that the juvenile court
systems are an attempt, on the part of the States, to handle misbehaving young-
sters apart from the traditional system of criminal justice6 ' and that such de-
linquency proceedings are basically civil in nature because there is no finding of
criminal status.52 Thus, there is no necessity to use the standard of proof re-
quired in criminal cases. 53 The Supreme Court rejected this argument: "We
made clear in [Gault] that civil labels and good intentions do not them-
selves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts, for
'[a] proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be "de-
"Reasonable doubt" has been defined as "that state of the case, which, after the entire
comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that con-
dition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the
truth of the charge'." 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2497, at 317-18 (3d ed. 1940).
Preponderance of the evidence is defined as "'that evidence which, when fairly, fully and
impartially considered by the jury, produces the stronger impression and has the greatest
weight.. . and is more convincing as to its truth, when contrasted or weighed against the
evidence in opposition thereto'." Yamamoto v. Puget Sound Lumber Co., 84 Wash. 411, 417,
146 P. 861, 863 (1915).
As to the applicability of the rules of evidence in juvenile delinquency proceedings, see
Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1128-46 (1955).
44. 397 U.S. at 362.
45. Id. at 363.
46. Id.
47. Id. It should be noted that the presumption of innocence is not explicitly mentioned
in the Constitution either. See Coffin v. United States, 156 US. 432 (1895) where the Court
stated that the presumption of innocence lies at the basis of criminal law.
48. 397 US. at 364.
49. 24 N.Y.2d 196, 247 N.E.2d 253, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1969).
50. Id. at 203, 247 N.E.2d at 257, 299 N.YS.2d at 420.
51. Id. at 198, 247 N.E.2d at 254-55, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
52. Id. at 203, 247 N.E.2d at 257, 299 N.Y..2d at 420.
53. Id.
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linquent" and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seri-
ousness to a felony prosecution'."''
The Court also rejected the argument that the requirement of a higher standard
of proof would destroy the beneficial aspects of special juvenile procedures.
Ideally, the juvenile courts were to be a forum where the problems of the in-
dividual child could be considered with the use of the most scientific methods of
investigation and treatment.60 Any disposition of a case would be made in rela-
tionship to the needs of the particular child and on the basis of information ob-
tained about him, and not within a predetermined frame of reference concerning
offenses and punishments.57 They were designed to provide the offender with the
protection of the state, not punishment.58
Beneath what appear to be basic legal considerations of whether an adjudica-
tion of delinquency is a civil or criminal procedure lies the more elemental
problem of what is the nature of delinquency. The reformers of the 20th century
predicated their whole philosophy on the belief that delinquency was an in-
dividual aberration from the social norm and the court was a form of treatment
center for the individual.50 The courts maintain this rationale in viewing their
role as rehabilitative rather than punitive despite the mounting evidence that
they are in fact the latter and not the former.00
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger expressed his hope that the emphasis on
procedural due process decisions "will not spell the end of a generously con-
ceived program of compassionate treatment intended to mitigate the rigors and
trauma of exposing youthful offenders to a traditional criminal court . . .20
Implicit in Chief Justice Burger's reasoning is a belief that juvenile courts are
capable of giving the youthful offender attention of superior quality to that given
in regular courts, simply by virtue of the fact that they are not procedurally
limited as are regular courts.
Today, however, some commentators believe that delinquency, rather than
being an individual aberration, is a social and economic problem.02 They main-
tain that the courts are not equipped to deal with the problem and that they
shouldn't try to. The emphasis should be on change and rehabilitation before
the youth comes to the attention of the courts, and the juvenile court system
54. 397 U.S. at 365-66.
55. Id. at 366.
56. E. Sutherland & D. Cressey, supra note 11, at 399.
57. Id. at 400.
58. Id. at 399.
59. See Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905, 907-09 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Coats v.
Markley, 200 F. Supp. 686, 687 (S.D. Ind. 1962); In re Johnson, 178 F. Supp. 1S, 163-64
(D.N.J. 1957).
60. Miller, The Dilemma of the Post-Gault Juvenile Court, 3 Family L.Q. 229 (1969);
Nicholas, History, Philosophy, and Procedures of Juvenile Courts, 1 J. Family Law 151
(1961).
61. 397 U.S. at 376.
62. See Commission Report, supra note 14, at 56-57. See also Spencer, Beyond Gault and
Whittington-The Best of Both Worlds?, 22 U. Miami L. Rev. 906, 908-10 (1968).
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should be a "last resort;"03 a court like all others in providing Constitutional
safeguards.
One can only guess at the effect of these latest theories of delinquency. As the
Supreme Court has considered the problems of the juvenile courts, it has moved
toward the requirements of procedural due process. However, the Court has not
completely defined the outer limits of what it would consider essential. In Gault,
the Court included as necessary notice of charges, the right to counsel, the right
to examination and confrontation, and the privilege against self-incrimination. In
Winship, the Court added the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Currently before the court is a case raising the question of the need for jury
trials in delinquency adjudications . 4 Though it seems remote that the Court will
decree that a juvenile should be tried by a jury of his peers, the philosophy of
the proponents of the "last resort" theory is cited in Winship with approval,G5
and the Court concludes by voicing agreement with Chief Judge Fuld who wrote
the dissenting opinion in W. v. Family Court: "I do not believe that a lesser
standard may be justified on the theory that the proceedings ... are designed, in
the words of the court.. . 'not to punish, but to save the child.' "10
Constitutional Law-State Action-Regulation of College Disciplinary
Code.-Plaintiffs were students at Wagner College, a privately supported,
church affiliated college located in New York. On April 23, 1970, they entered
the office of the Dean of the college to confer with him, and remained there in
violation of an order of the Dean of Students requiring them to vacate. They
were subsequently expelled, pursuant to the rules and regulations for the main-
tenance of public order adopted by the college following the enactment of New
York State Education Law section 6450.1 Plaintiffs brought suit in the United
63. "[W]here the intention was once to get the troubled child into the courts as fast
as possible, the aim will now be to keep him out of court altogether, if that is possible. There
is a deeper difference, however, than in the method of proceeding. Fundamentally, the con-
viction is no longer shared that crime can be reduced or children, in large numbers, 'saved'
by the tactic of treating the individual deviant .... Patient attack on basic social evils,
together with sorrowful, helpful but firm response to those who cause serious harm, are the
actions that commend themselves ... ." Paulsen, Children's Court: Gateway or Last Resort?,
in M. Paulsen, Cases & Selected Problems in Family Law and Poverty 1006, 1011 (1969).
64. In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350, prob. juris. noted sub. nom. McKedver v.
Pennsylvania, 399 U.S. 925 (1970).
65. In the majority opinion, at 397 U.S. at 364, 366 n.4, there are cites to Dorsen and
Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, supra note 42. See 397 U.S. at 369 n.1
(Harlan, J., concurring) where there is reference to Paulsen, juvenile Courts and the Legacy
of '67, 43 Ind. L.J. 527, 551-52 (1968). Paulsen is a major architect of the last-resort theory.
See note 64 supra.
66. W. v. Family Court, 24 N.Y.2d at 203, 247 N.E.2d at 258, 299 N.YS.2d at 421.
1. N.Y. Educ. Law § 6450 (McKinney Supp. 1970) provides:
"1. The trustees or other governing board of every college chartered by the regents or
incorporated by special act of the legislature shall adopt rules and regulations for the main-
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States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking an order of
the court directing the college to reinstate them pending a hearing, to satisfy
the requirements of due process in its hearing procedures, and to cease racially
discriminatory expulsions 2 The district court dismissed the complaint for lack
of federal jurisdiction.3 The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,
reversed and remanded to the district court for a further hearing to determine
whether section 6450 represents a meaningful state intrusion into the disciplinary
policies of private colleges and universities, sufficient to constitute state action
under the fourteenth amendment.4 Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120
(2d Cir. 1970).
The Supreme Court has long held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment does not apply to wholly private acts.5 Out of this has arisen the
tenance of public order on college campuses and other college property used for educational
purposes and provide a program for the enforcement thereof. Such rules and regulations shall
govern the conduct of students, faculty and other staff as well as visitors and other licensees
and invitees on such campuses and property. The penalties for violations of such rules and
regulation shall be clearly set forth therein and shall include provisions for the ejection of a
violator from such campus and property, and in the case of a student or faculty violator
his suspension, expulsion or other appropriate disciplinary action. Such rules and regulations
shall be filed with the regents and the commissioner of education not later than ninety days
after the effective date of this act. All amendments to such rules and regulations shall be
filed with the regents and the commissioner of education not later than ten days after their
adoption.
"2. If the trustees or other governing board of a college falls to file the rules and regula-
tions within the time required by this section such college shall not be eligible to receive
any state aid or assistance until such rules and regulations are duly filed.
"3. Nothing contained in this section is intended nor shall it be construed to limit or re-
strict the freedom of speech nor peaceful assembly."
In the original slip opinion (Coleman v. Wagner College, No. 34869 (2d Cir. June 22,
1970)), the court misread the text of § 6450, substituting "may" for "shall" in the clause call-
ing for the enumeration of certain penalties to be enforced against students and faculty. No.
34869, at 3410 n.1. This error is made all the more surprising by the existence of the Gov-
ernor's Memorandum (also cited by the court at 3414-15), which specifically provides that
"penalties for violations . . . must include provisions for: -ejection of violators from the
campus; and, -suspension, expulsion, or other appropriate disciplinary action in the case of
a student or faculty violation."
Thus it may be seen that the court's suggestion that even the most lenient code would
suffice under the statute is erroneous. Had the court chosen to pursue the matter further,
an even stronger case of state action might have been made out, relying on a correct reading
of the statute.
2. Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120, 1123 (2d Cir. 1970).
3. See id. at 1123.
4. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Factors to be explored on remand included "[tjhe actions
of the state officials with whom the rules are to be filed" and "[the attitude of the college
administrators required to draft regulations by the statute." Id. at 1125.
5. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). "It is State action of a particular character
that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the
amendment." 109 U.S. at 11. See also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55
[Vol, 39
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doctrine of "state action," which holds that, in order for a plaintiff to establish
federal jurisdiction under the fourteenth amendment, he must show that he is
being deprived of due process by the actions of a state, and not those of a
purely private person.6 Application of this doctrine is often found in the area of
racial discrimination.7
It has been a matter of contention whether the acts of quasi-public bodies,
such as "private" universities, are subject to due process requirements, absent
the requisite indicia of "state action."8 This question has generally been resolved
in the negative by the courts9 and argued for in the affirmative by the com-
mentators.10
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority," which has been called "a case
without precedent,"12 may be seen as an outpost on the frontier of state action.
(1875). "The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from denying to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; but this provision does not ... add any thing
to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against another." In Vrginia v.
Rives, 100 US. 313 (1879), the court stated that "[tihe provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution... all have reference to State action exclusively, and not to any
action of private individuals." 100 U.S. at 318; accord, Fx Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47
(1879).
6. The fourteenth amendment "erects no shield against merely private conduct." Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 US. 1, 13 (1948).
7. E.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 US. 130 (1964);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.. 715 (1961); Terry v. Adams, 345 US.
461 (1953) ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) ; Smith v. Allwright, 321 US. 649 (1944).
8. See, e.g., O'Neil, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 Buffalo L. Rev. 155 (1970);
St. Antoine, Color Blindness but Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action, Equal Pro-
tection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 993 (1961); Wilkinson &
Rolapp, The Private College and Student Discipline, 56 A.B.A.J. 121 (1970); Wright, The
Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027 (1969); Developments in the Law-
Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045, 1054-64 (1968).
9. See, e.g., Browns v. M,itchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969); Grossner v. Trustees of
Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp.
609 (D.D.C. 1967), rev'd in part on other grounds, dismissed in part as moot, 412 F.2d
1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D.
La. 1962). See also Wilkinson & Rolapp, supra note 8. But cf. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73
(2d Cir. 1968); Pennsylvania v. Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782 (EfD. Pa. 1967), aft'd, 392 F.2d
120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968).
10. Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 43 Cornell L. Rev. 375 (1958); Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action"
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. Cal. L. Rev. 208 (1968); O'NCil, supra note 8;
St. Antoine, supra note 8; Wright, supra note 8; Note, The Scope of University Discipline,
35 Brooklyn L. Rev. 486 (1969) ; Note, Reasonable Rules, Reasonably Enforced-Guidelines
for University Disciplinary Proceedings, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 301 (1968); Comment, Student
Due Process in the Private University: The State Action Doctrine, 20 Syracuse L. Rev. 911
(1969).
11. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
12. Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority-A Case Without Precedent, 61
Colum. L. Rev. 1458 (1961).
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In Burton it was held, for the first time, that state inaction in preventing dis-
crimination by a lessee of state owned property may be such state action as will
give rise to a claim under the fourteenth amendment by one who is discriminated
against.13 In this respect, Burton goes a step beyond the classic state action cases,
which typically presented the Court with a situation in which an essentially
public, or state, function was being performed in a discriminatory manner by a
seemingly private individual. 14 Burton presented a situation in which an es-
sentially private function, the operation of a restaurant, became an action of the
state, at least for fourteenth amendment purposes, by virtue of its location in a
public facility.'5 This decision involved a novel twist on the theory of "state
action." Rather than searching for a state function which was being performed
by private individuals, the court, it seemed, was looking for a private function
into which the state had "insinuated" itself to a degree susceptible of constitu-
tional regulation.'"
In the field of education, the courts have, until recent years, been careful to
draw the line between public and private higher education. 17 While there has
been gradual judicial encroachment upon the prerogatives of state universities
and public school systems,' 8 the trend in the private sector has not been as clear.
Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University19 held that "[t]here is insuffi-
cient state involvement in the operation of the Tulane University of Louisiana
to bring it within the privileges and proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment
13. 365 U.S. at 726.
14. E.g., Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968)
(picketing on mall of privately-owned shopping center, which was operated as public
business thoroughfare) ; Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (state court appointment of
park trustees under racially discriminatory will); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964)
(deputization of amusement park's private patrolman to facilitate enforcement of park
owner's private policy of racial discrimination); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)
(exclusion of Negroes from party primary in one party state) ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948) (state court enforcement of racially discriminatory restrictive covenant); Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (private corporation-owned town posted signs prohibting
distribution of religious literature).
15. 365 U.S. at 722-25.
16. "By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not only made itself
a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power, property and prestige
behind the admitted discrimination. The State has so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with Eagle [Coffee Shop] that it must be recognized as a joint participant
in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to have been so
'purely private' as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 725.
17. See, e.g., Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609, 612-13 (D.D.C. 1967), rev'd in
part on other grounds, dismissed in part as moot, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
18. E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961). See
also Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969); Due v.
Florida A & M Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (NJ). Fla. 1963); Denno, Mary Beth Tinker Takes
the Constitution to School, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 35 (1969); Wilkinson & Rolapp, supra
note 8, at 121.
19. 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
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to the United States Constitution."- ° The district court was able to reach this
conclusion despite the fact that state officers sat on the University's board,21 the
state had transferred property to the board,2 2 all of the board's property enjoyed
a state tax exemptionn2 and the state constitution sanctioned a statutory rever-
sionary clause which set forth circumstances under which University property
might revert to the state.24 The court termed these connections between the state
and the university "not so significant. ' - ra
Guillory was followed several years later by Pennsylvania v. Brown. 0 the
most recent litigation involving the will of Stephen Girard.2 In an earlier case
the exclusion of Negroes from Girard College had been held to constitute pro-
hibited state action, in violation of the fourteenth amendment, in that the board
which operated the college was an agency of the state.2 8 However, the Court
had not ordered the admission of the Negro plaintiffs into the college at that
time.2 9 Subsequently, the Philadelphia Orphan's Court appointed substitute
trustees to administer Girard College.30 In Brown the district court ruled that
the state had become so entwined in the administration of the trust (which
operated the college) over a period of more than a century and a quarter that
it could not disassociate itself by the simple device of appointing private
trustees.3 ' As a result, discrimination by any trustees was barred by the four-
teenth amendment.3 2
20. Id. at 687.
21. Id. at 683-84.
22. Id. at 684.
23. Id. at 684-85.
24. Id. at 685. Law of July 5, 1884, No. 43, adopted, La. Const. Ann. art. 12, § 24 states
that if the Tulane Board should cease to use state property and exercise state privileges for
the purposes of the act (stated in the Preamble to be the fostering of the University of
Louisiana and the vesting in the Tulane Board, upon the adoption of the constitutional
amendment, of the power to create, develop, and maintain a great university in the City of
New Orleans) then the state shall have the right to resume the custody and control of the
property and powers formerly vested in the University of Louisiana. 212 F. Supp. at 686.
25. Id. at 687. After reciting the various connections between the state and the university,
the district court said: "In summary, it is the conclusion of this court that the state action
or involvement in the affairs of the Tulane Board is not so significant that it may fairly be
said that the actions of the Tulane Board are the actions of the State of Louisiana. To this
extent the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief and this court so finds." Id. The court therefore
held that the operations of Tulane University did not fall within the purview of the
fourteenth amendment.
26. 270 F. Supp. 782 (ED. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 921 (1968).
27. The earlier litigation culminated in Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts,
353 U.S. 230 (1957) (the Girard College Case).
28. Id. at 231.
29. The Court remanded "for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion."
353 US. at 231. Thus the door was opened to subsequent litigation.
30. In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, appeal dismissed sub
nom. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 357 US. 570 (1958).
31. 270 F. Supp. at 789-92.
32. Id. at 792. Compare Brown with Evans v. Newton, 382 US. 296 (1966), where a
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In Greene v. Howard University 38 the District of Columbia court took a simi-
lar position to that taken in Guillory. Despite the evidence that a large percent-
age of the university's expenses were paid by annual appropriations made by
Congress,34 and the existence of a statutory provision for visitation and inspec-
tion of the University by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, the
court held that "[i] t is clear, therefore, that the principle which counsel for the
plaintiffs seek to invoke, namely, that a Government college or university may
not expel its students without notice of charges and an opportunity to be heard,
is not applicable to Howard University, for it is not a public institution nor does
it partake of any governmental character." 30 The relationship could be termi-
nated by the university without affording students and faculty due process. 7
What Judge Frankel has characterized as the "grave troubles... experienced
at Columbia University"38 in 1968 produced, inter alia, Grossner v. Trustees of
Columbia University."9 Basing their jurisdictional claim on 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1964) ,40 which creates a cause of action for deprivation of civil rights by per-
sons acting under color of law, several students sought to enjoin the disciplinary
procedures instituted against them by the university. The district court rejected
their contention that the state had insinuated itself into a position of interde-
pendence with the university so as to render the university's acts state acts.
41
Examining the ties between Columbia and the State of New York and finding
them wanting, the court stated that the "receipt of money from the State is not,
without a good deal more, enough to make the recipient an agency or instru-
state court's appointment of trustees of a park to replace the city which had resigned as
trustee to facilitate the appointment, was held to constitute "state action" where the obvious
purpose of the appointment was to perpetuate policies of segregation in the park which the
city itself could no longer carry out.
33. 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967), rev'd in part on other grounds, dismissed In part
as moot, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
34. 271 F. Supp. at 612.
35. 20 U.S.C. § 122 (1964). See also id. §§ 121, 123.
36. 271 F. Supp. at 612-13; see Maiatico Const. Co. v. United States, 79 F.2d 418,
420-23 (D.C. Cir. 1935), where the court held that Howard University was a private
institution.
37. 271 F. Supp. at 614. Some courts have followed a contractual approach to the rela-
tionship between students and the university. See John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla.
510, 102 So. 637 (1924); Drucker v. New York Univ., 59 Misc. 2d 789, 300 N.Y.S.2d 749
(App. T. 1969); cf. Samson v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 101 Misc. 146, 149, 167 N.Y.S.
202, 204 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 181 App. Div. 936, 167 N.Y.S. 1125 (1st Dep't 1917). See
also Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045, 1145-47 (1968).
38. Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
39. 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964): "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the dep-
rivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress."
41. 287 F. Supp. at 546-48.
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mentality of the Government." 42 Also rejected was the "public function" theory
of state action,43 which would subject the university to federal constitutional
requirements since it had adopted the "public function" of educating persons.
44
The reasoning in Grossner was carried to its logical conclusion in Powe v.
Miles,'45 which dealt with the disruption of a R.O.T.C. parade on the campus of
Alfred University. Even though Alfred was the beneficiary of some financial
assistance4 6 from the State of New York, and subject to state regulation of edu-
cational standards 4 7 the Second Circuit refused to find any facts sufficient to
clothe the actions of the university with the mantle of "state action" in the
expulsion of four liberal arts students.48 Speaking for a unanimous court, judge
Friendly said, "the state must be involved not simply with some activity of the
institution alleged to have inflicted injury upon a plaintiff but with the activity
that caused the injury. Putting the point another way, the state action, not the
private action, must be the subject of [the] complaint."40
This requirement of a specific correlation between the activity regulated by
the state and the injury incurred by the plaintiff appears to be new to the con-
cept of "state action." To some extent it has been followed in Browns v. Mitch-
eli3 0 which dealt with the question of whether preferential tax exemptions for a
42. Id. at 547-48.
43. Id. at 549. See generally Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L.
Rev. 1045, 1060-61 (1968).
44. "[Njothing supports the thesis that university (or private elementary) 'education'
as such is 'state action.'" 287 F. Supp. at 549.
45. 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
46. "President Miles thought state and federal aid, excluding scholarships to students
and the provision for C[ollege of] C[eramics], was only a hundred or two hundred thousand
dollars a year, as against the total budget of $6.8 minion." 407 F.2d at 81.
47. E.g, N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 207, 215, 305(2) (McKinney 1969). These sections set forth
the functions of the regents, provide for visitation and reports, and outline general powers
and duties of the commissioner of education.
48. We perceive no basis for holding that the grant of scholarships and the financing
of C[ollege of] C[eramics] imposes on the State a duty to see that Alfred's overall policies
with respect to demonstrations and discipline conform to First and Fourteenth Amendment
standards so that state inaction might constitute an object of attack.' 407 F.2d at 81. How-
ever, the court did find state action in the expulsion of sudents of the New York State
College of Ceramics at Alfred University, a state-supported institution under contract with
the State of New York. Id. at 83.
49. Id. at 81. It is upon this dictum of Judge Friendly that appellants in Coleman v.
Wagner College based their appeal. 429 F.2d at 1123; Brief for Appellant at 10, 12-13;
Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970). judge Friendly cited Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). "[T]he fact that New York has
exercised some regulatory powers over the standard of education offered by Alfred University
does not implicate it generally in Alfred's policies toward demonstrations and disciplineY
407 F.2d at 81.
50. 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969) ; accord, Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ,
212 F. Supp. 675 (E.D. La. 1962). "[TIhis court is unable to find legal support for the
proposition that a simple grant of state funds to a private institution, be it in the form
of a tax exemption or otherwise, is state action per se." Id. at 685.
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private university will give rise to acts under "color of state law." The Tenth
Circuit held that "[t]he benefits conferred, however characterized, have no
bearing on the challenged actions beyond the perpetuation of the institution it-
self." 5' 1 To this extent at least, Browns appears to be following the correlation
requirement of Powe.
Thus it may be seen that the general weight of judicial opinion leans heavily
towards finding little or no state involvement in the administration of private
universities. Frequently, where a finding of such involvement is inescapable, the
courts will view it as "not significant."' ' 2
In the present case, the circuit court considered the question of whether the
state had intervened in the performance of a function traditionally entrusted to
private organizations, i.e., the maintenance of internal order by private univer-
sities, to such an extent as to subject the imposition of disciplinary sanctions by
such private colleges and universities to scrutiny under the fourteenth amend-
ment. 53
The court examined the apparent legislative intent behind section 64504 in the
context of widespread legislative "backlash" against student protestors . 5 The
question presented would seem to turn upon the degree of "regulation" contem-
plated by the statute.5 6 Judge Kaufman noted the possibility that the statutory
requirements were minimal, stating that:
One wonders whether rules and regulations consisting solely of the statement that any
individual guilty of a transgression against the public order of the campus shall be
required to give the Dean of the College a rose and a peppercorn on Midsummer's Day
would satisfy the literal command of the statute in all respects.57
The court held, however, that the possibility exists that "the statute may have
been intended, or may be applied, to mean more than it purports to say."58 It
may be viewed as an attempt to "coerce colleges to adopt disciplinary codes
embodying a 'hard-line' attitude toward student protestors."50 If that is the
case, Judge Friendly's dictum in Powe6 may well be satisfied since the action
51. 409 F.2d at 596, citing Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
52. See, e.g., Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (El). La.
1962). See also Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967), rev'd In part
on other grounds, dismissed in part as moot, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
53. The court characterized this as "an interesting variation on the familiar theme of
state action." 429 F.2d at 1121.
54. Id. at 1124.
55. Id. at 1125, n.5.
56. See text accompanying note 1, supra.
57. 429 F.2d at 1124.
58. Id. "The Governor's Memorandum approving section 6450 referred to an 'Intolerable
situation on the Cornell University Campus' and spoke of 'the urgent need for adequate plans
for student-university relations' ..... " (emphasis deleted).
59. Id. at 1125.
60. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968). "State action would be . . . present
here with respect to all the students if New York had undertaken to set policy for tho
control of demonstrations in all private universities ... :
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by the state would have been directly related to the petitioners' e-xpulsion.01 The
court remanded for a further hearing to explore the manner in which section
6450 is viewed by both the state officials with whom the rules and regulations
are to be filed, and the university administrators who are to file them.0a
Judge Friendly, concurring, would have gone still further, and remanded for
consideration on the merits.0 Once the state has stepped in, as it has every right
to do, he argued, the colleges, by promulgating such rules and regulations, are
exercising a power emanating from the legislature, and cannot act solely on their
own authority."' "When a state has gone so far in directing private action that
citizens may reasonably believe this to have been taken at the state's instance,
state action may legitimately be found even though the state left the private
actors almost complete freedom of choice." 5 But even Judge Friendly recog-
nized that, assuming arguendo, the presence of state action, "neither the First
Amendment nor the due process clause of the Fourteenth prevents reasonable
regulation of student protests by educational institutions, including summary
suspension when that is deemed necessary to prevent a situation from getting
out of hand." 66
The possibility exists that a state may, unintentionally, "[insinuate) itself
into a position of interdependence" 67 with a private university by overzealously
attempting to regulate the internal disciplinary processes of that institution. The
need for greater discipline may be sorely felt by the legislatures and the judi-
61. "By enacting section 6450, [plaintiffs] argue, the state legislature did undertake to
set policy for dealing with campus demonstrations and, in fact, became involved with the
regulation of the very activity by which the plaintiffs claim to have been unjustly injured-
the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for offenses against the public order on college
campuses." 429 F.2d at 1123. "If these considerations have merit and section 6450 was
intended to coerce colleges to adopt disciplinary codes embodying a 'hard-line' attitude
toward student protesters, it would appear that New York has indeed 'undertaken to set
policy for the control of demonstrations in all private universities' and should be held
responsible for the implementation of this policy." Id. at 1125 (citation omitted).
62. "If the state officials prevented the regulations from being filed because of substantive
'inadequacies' or exercised any other influence upon their content, these officials would
provide strong indicia of state action. A reasonable and widespread belief among college
administrators that section 6450 required them to adopt a particular stance toward campus
demonstrators would seem to justify a conclusion that the state intended for them to pursue
that course. This intent would afford a basis to find state action." Headnote, Coleman v.
Wagner College, 164 N.Y.L., July 30, 1970, at 1.
63. 429 F.2d at 1126.
64. Id. (concurring opinion); cf. Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F2d
531 (5th Cir. 1960).
65. 429 F.2d 1127, (concurring opinion). The Rules and Regulations of Wagner College
begin with a statement that they were drafted "in accordance with the newly enacted New
York Public Law 129-a, which required such a document," and then set out a copy of § 6450
in full. Id. at 1126.
66. 429 F.2d at 1127.
67. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
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ciary alike,6 8 but the price a state may have to pay for the benefit of such deter-
rence in private colleges is the acceptance of the responsibility "for preventing
overdeterrence by excessive sanctions and lack of fair procedure for enforce-
ment."6 9
Evidence-Admissibility of Declarations Against Penal Interest.-Appellant
was convicted of murder having been unable to establish his claim of self-
defense. He had maintained that the victim was armed; the police, however,
were unable to find the weapon alleged to have been in the victim's possession.
Appellant sought to admit a statement made by a third party to the effect that
the third party had picked up the gun in question immediately after the shooting
and subsequently used it in committing a robbery. The third party, however,
refused to testify to this declaration, invoking the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. The appellate division sustained the trial court's ruling that the declara-
tion was not admissible.' In a unanimous decision the court of appeals reversed
and ordered a new trial, holding that the exception to the hearsay rule for
declarations against interest includes declarations against penal interest provided
that the declarant is unavailable to testify.2 People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 257
N.E.2d 16, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1970).
Traditionally, hearsay evidence has been held inadmissible since the declarant
is not available as a witness and the veracity of his statement cannot be tested
by cross-examination. 3 There are, however, a number of exceptions to the rule
which excludes hearsay evidence,4 one being the admission of statements classi-
fied as declarations against interest.5 Under these exceptions, evidence, although
68. See generally General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in
Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D.
133 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
69. 429 F.2d at 1126 (concurring opinion).
1. People v. Brown, 28 App. Div. 2d 646, 282 N.Y.S.2d 215 (4th Dep't 1967).
2. The court, in addition, clarified the grounds of unavailability which will be sufficient to
serve as a basis for the admission of the evidence; see note 36 infra and accompanying text.
3. J. Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 207, at 197 (9th ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as
Richardson]; see C. McCormick, Evidence § 224, at 458 (1954) [hereinafter cited as
McCormick]; J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1361-62 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1964) [hereinafter cited
as Wigmore]; Note, Declarations Against Interest-Rules of Admissibility, 62 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 934 (1968).
4. For a discussion of the other exceptions to the hearsay rule see E. Fisch, Fisch on New
York Evidence §§ 891-1022 (1959, Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Fisch]; McCormick
§§ 230-99; G. Motta, New York Evidence §§ 156-207 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Mottia];
Wigmore § 1426.
5. United States v. Dovico, 261 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aft'd, 380 F.2d 325 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 944 (1967); Neely v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 241 Mo. App.
1244, 252 S.W.2d 88 (1952); Kittredge v. Grannis, 244 N.Y. 168, 155 N.E. 88 (1926);
Tomkins v. Fonda Glove Lining Co., 188 N.Y. 261, 80 N.E. 933 (1907); Brennan v. Hall,
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clearly hearsay is admitted when there is a justified reason for the absence of
the declarant as a witness8 and there is present an inherent "probability of trust-
worthiness." 7 For example, declarations against interest have been admitted in
the belief that man, by his nature, would not voluntarily make a statement detri-
mental to himself unless he believed it to be true.8 Without such exceptions
evidence which is probably reliable might otherwise be excluded.
Declarations against interest have been allowed for over two hundred years. 10
131 N.Y. 160, 29 N.E. 1009 (1892); Alexander Grant's Sons v. Phoenix Assurance Co, 25
App. Div. 2d 93, 267 N.Y.S.2d 220 (4th Dep't 1966); Martorella v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 238 App. Div. 532, 264 N.Y.S. 751 (4th Dep't 1933); Massachusetts Bonding &
Ins. Co. v. City of Cleveland, 187 N.E.2d 369 (Ohio 1963). See also Fisch §§ 891-903;
McCormick §§ 253-57; Mottla § 158; Richardson §§ 236-47; Wigmore § 1455; Jefferson,
Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 1
(1944).
The exceptions for declarations against interest and for admissions are often confused.
Carpenter v. Davis, 435 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. 1968); Brautigam v. Hoffman, 444 S.W.2d 528
(Mo. CL App. 1969). Unlike admissions-which require the declarant to be a party in the
case or to be in privity with a party-declarations against interest require only that the
words spoken be contrary to the interests of the unavailable declarant. McCormick § 253.
The exception for dying declarations is to be distinguished from that for declarations
against interest. In New York, dying declarations, which are used only in homicide cases, must
be made by the victim, must concern the cause or circumstances of his death and need not
be against the declarant's interests. Wigmore §§ 1432-34. For the current trend in the use
of dying declarations in light of constitutional issues see Comment, The Admissability of
Dying Declarations, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 509 (1970).
6. Syracuse Eng'r Co. v. Haight, 97 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1938); United States v. Miller, 277
F. Supp. 200, 208 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 381 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 929
(1968); Alexander Grant's Sons v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 93, 95, 267
N.Y.S.2d 220, 222-23 (4th Dep't 1966). But see Oscar Gruss & Son v. Lumbermens Mut.
Cas. Co., 422 F.2d 1278, 1282-83 (2d Cir. 1970).
See Wigmore §§ 1421, 1456 on the "necessity principle." See also Note, supra note 3, at
936-41. The fact that the declarant is deceased or otherwise unavailable is insufficient in
itself to justify an exception to the hearsay rule. Ellwanger v. Whiteford, 15 App. Div. 2d
898, 225 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1st Dep't 1962), afiPd, 12 N.Y.2d 1037, 190 N.E.2d 24, 239 N.Y.S.2d
680 (1963), wherein there was an accidental death of a trespassing infant while fleeing from
threats of a watchman. Declarations of the watchman, since deceased, were held not suf-
ficient to be within declaration against interest exception: it being essential that the dedarant
knowingly make a declaration against his proprietary or pecuniary interest. People v. Dolan,
186 N.Y. 4, 14, 78 N.E. 569, 572 (1906); Griffin v. Train, 90 App. Div. 16, 85 N.Y.S. 686
(1st Dep't 1904) ; Prince, Evidence, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 377, 379-80 (1962).
7. Alexander v. State, 449 P.2d 153 (Nev. 1968); Meyer v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co.
13 Wis. 2d 156, 108 N.W.2d 278 (1961); Wigmore §§ 1422, 1457-69, at 204, 262-78.
8. Hileman v. Northwest Eng'r Co., 346 F.2d 668 (6th Cir. 1965); Filesi v. United States,
352 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1965); G.M. McKelvey Co. v. General Cas. Co. of America, 166 Ohio
St. 401, 142 N.E.2d 854 (1957); Wigmore § 1457, at 262-63; Proposed Fed. R. of Evidence
8-04(b) (4) and Example (4), 46 F.R.D. 161, 385-87 (1969); Model Code of Evidence rule
509, Comment C (1942).
9. Note, supra note 3, at 934-35.
10. Warren v. Greenville, 93 Eng. Rep. 1079 (K.B. 1740); lanming v. Lechmere, 26 Eng.
Rep. 288 (Ch. 1737).
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Prior to 1844, it would appear that declarations against penal interest were
admissible.-" In that year the House of Lords decided the Sussex Peerage case
in which a party attempted to establish his parents' lawful marriage by the
admission of a deceased person's declaration that he had married the couple, the
circumstances of which act made it criminal. 12 The court held declarations
against penal interest to be inadmissible expressing a general desire for care and
caution before, as they viewed it, extending an exception to the hearsay rule."'
In 1913, this limitation was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
Donnelly v. United States.'4 In that case, a witness sought to introduce the con-
fession of a third person, then deceased, made outside of the courtroom, to the
murder of which defendant was accused.' 5 The Donnelly holding is presently
the rule in most American jurisdictions.'" The majority of jurisdictions only
allow the admission of declarations which are adverse to the declarant's
11. Powell v. Harper, 172 Eng. Rep. 1112, 1113 (NP. 1833); Standen v. Standen, 170
Eng. Rep. 73, 74 (N.P. 1791). An example of the declaration against interest exception would
be if a witness were allowed to relate a statement spoken by an unavailable third party
declarant and if the words spoken would have been such as to open the way for a criminal
prosecution against the declarant. See generally, Richardson § 241; Wigmore § 1476;
Jefferson, supra note 5; Morgan, Declarations Against Interest, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 451 (1952);
Annot., 162 A.L.R. 446 (1946).
12. Sussex Peerage, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (H.L. 1844). The case involved an attempt by the
grandson of George I to prove the lawful marriage of his parents and thereby receivo the
rights due an heir to the English throne. The claimant sought to admit a declaration by the
marrying clergyman, since deceased, admitting the performance of the rites of the English
church in Rome, an act which at that time, would have been a felony. The House of Lords
excluded the declaration and denied the claim. Id. at 1041-42.
13. Id. at 1045. Compare text accompanying note 43 infra.
14. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
15. Id. at 273. In establishing the prevailing view excluding declarations against interest,
Donnelly cited decisions from 16 states including two cases from New York-People v.
Schooley, 149 N.Y. 99, 43 N.E. 536 (1896) ; Greenfield v. People, 85 N.Y. 75 (1881).
Early federal court decisions were generally in accord with the reasoning of the Sussex
Peerage case. United States v. McMahon, 26 F. Cas. 1131 (No. 15,699) (D.C. Cir. 1835)
(murder); United States v. Miller, 26 F. Cas. 1255 (No. 15,773) (D.C. Cir. 1830) (illegal
gambling house); United States v. Mulholland, 50 F. 413, 416 (D. Ky. 1892), appeal dis-
missed, 149 U.S. 782 (1893) (embezzlement); United States v. Randall, 27 F. Cas. 696
(No. 16,118) (D. Ore. 1869) (larceny).
16. See Scolari v. United States, 406 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981 (1969);
Wesson v. State, 238 Ala. 399, 191 So. 249 (1939); Moya v. People, 79 Colo. 104, 244 P. 69
(1926) ; Cobb v. State, 219 Ga. 388, 133 S.E.2d 596, cert. denied, 311 U.S. 943 (1963) ; Weber
v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 175 Iowa 358, 151 N.W. 852 (1916); Alexander v. State, 449
P.2d 153 (Nev. 1968); Petition of Winineger, 337 P.2d 445 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1959);
Newton v. State, 61 Okla. Crim. 237, 71 P.2d 122 (1937); Commonwealth v. Antonini, 165
Pa. Super. 501, 69 A.2d 436 (1949); McLain v. Anderson Free Press, 232 S.C. 448, 102
S.E.2d 750 (1958); 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 219, at 608-09 (1964).
17. "An exception to the general rule excluding hearsay testimony Is found in the re-
ception as against A of declarations made by B who is dead, known by him when made to
be against his pecuniary interest." Kittredge v. Grannis, 244 N.Y. 168, 175, 155 N.E. 88, 90
(1926). In that case records of a deceased third party declarant were admitted to establish
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pecuniary 17 or proprietary' s interests. A number of states have codified this
rule, excluding declarations involving penal interest.'0
Although a lack of uniformity prevails, there has been a recent trend towards
admitting declarations against penal interest.20 Some courts, when admitting
such declarations, have restricted admittance to cases where it is highly pertinent
to the outcome.2 ' Several states have adopted such a "special circumstances"
rule.Y In one such jurisdiction such declarations are apparently admitted in
civil cases although excluded, with no apparent distinguishing rationale, in crimi-
nal cases.P In still other jurisdictions a statement against one's penal interest
conversion of plaintiffs bonds by the third party and to deny defendant the rights accorded a
holder in due course. In another case a receipt by a deceased sheriff was admitted to prove
that the debt in question was satisfied on the basis that the "[o]fficer thereby charged him-
self with the money, and rendered himself accountable for it to the creditor." Livingston v.
Arnoux, 56 N.Y. 507, 519 (1874).
18. "It is well settled that the declarations of a deceased grantor of real estate in refer-
ence to the title thereto and against his interest, made at a time when he is in the possession
of the land, are admissible even in an action against a person who claims nothing under the
grantor and is not strictly in privity with him." People v. Storrs, 207 N.Y. 147, 160, 100
N.E. 730, 734 (1912), citing Lyon v. Ricker, 141 N.Y. 225, 36 N.E. 189 (1894). See also
Beattie v. Garrison, 204 App. Div. 335, 198 N.YS. 71 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 236 N.Y. 574, 142
N.E. 289 (1923).
19. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. §§ 38-308, -309, -405 (1954); Idaho Code Ann. § 16-403
(1963); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-1101 (1964); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1221 (1965); Ore.
Rev. Stat. §§ 41.850, .860, .900 (1969); Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-8 (1953). See also P.R.
Laws Ann. tit. 32, § 1678 (1968). Cf. statutes in notes 32 & 33 infra.
20. Compare Mason v. United States, 257 F.2d 359, 360 (10th Cir.) (dictum), cert.
denied, 358 US. 831 (1958) with People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 389 P2d 377, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 841 (1964); State v. Larson, 91 Idaho 42, 415 P.2d 685 (1966); Dyson v. State, 238
Md. 398, 209 A.2d 609 (1965), vacated sub nom. Dyson v. Maryland, 383 US. 106 (1966);
State v. Sejuelas, 94 N.J. Super. 576, 229 A.2d 659 (1967).
21. People v. Lettrich, 413 I. 172, 108 N.E.2d 488 (1952); Petition of Winineger, 337
P.2d 445, 452 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1958) (Nix, J., dissenting); Cameron v. State, 153 Tex.
Crim. 29, 217 S.W.2d 23 (Crim. Ct. App. 1949).
22. In one instance, which involved a murder charge based upon solely circumstantial
evidence, the court admitted an unavailable third party's confession to the crime based
upon the special circumstances of the case. Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E.
843 (1923). See People v. Lettrich, 413 Ill. 172, 108 N.E.2d 488 (1952) (unavailable third
party's confession to rape and murder admitted in light of special circumstances consisting of
circumstantial evidence and a repudiation of a coerced confession of the defendant) ; Brady
v. State, 226 Md. 422, 174 A.2d 167 (1961), aff'd sub nom. Brady v. Maryland, 373 US. 83
(1963); Thomas v. State, 186 Md. 446, 47 Aad 43 (1946) (accomplice confession to murder
excluded by trial court held to be grounds for a new trial) ; Blocker v. State, 55 Tex. Crim.
30, 114 S.W. 814 (1908) (unavailable third party's confession to the murder admitted be-
cause his motive for the crime was at par with that of the defendant); Newherry v. Common-
wealth, 191 Va. 445, 61 S.E.2d 318 (1950) (unavailable third party's confession to murder
admitted). See also Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 134 A. 148 (1926) (admitting declaration
in bastardy proceeding).
23. Compare Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945) (civil case in which
declaration against penal interest was admitted) with State v. Gordon, 356 Mo. 1010, 204
S.W.2d 713 (1947) (declaration against penal interest not admitted in criminal case).
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is considered to impute a loss to one's pecuniary or proprietary interest, and
thus is admitted on the latter grounds.2 4
The most noteworthy of recent cases is People v. Spriggs2  In Spriggs, the
California Supreme Court equated declarations against penal interest with those
against pecuniary or proprietary interests without requiring any qualifying
factors.
The Model Code of Evidence,26 the Uniform Rules of Evidence 27 and the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence28 would expand the law on declarations
against interest to include those declarations which are against penal interest
and even those declarations that create "such a risk of making him [the declar-
ant] an object of hatred, ridicule or social disapproval in the community that
a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless
he believed it to be true."' ' Whereas the Model Code sets down guidelines as to
what portions of the declaration are admissible (excluding extrinsic comments), 0
the Uniform and the Proposed Rules do not contain such a statement beyond
excluding unconstitutional confessions. 3' The recently prepared Proposed Fed-
24. Sucher Packing Co. v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 245 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 956 (1958); Citizens' Natl Bank v. Santa Rita Hotel Co., 22 F.2d 524
(9th Cir. 1927) (suit to collect on a note in which declarant, unavailable, admitted to the
forgery of defendant's name was liable civilly and criminally); Clark & Jones, Inc. v.
American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 889 (ED. Tenn. 1953); Weber v. Chicago, R.I.
& Pac. Ry., 175 Iowa 358, 151 N.W. 852 (1916) (train derailment suit for personal injury in
which the unavailable declarant admitted causing the wreck and was liable civilly and
criminally); G.M. McKelvey Co. v. General Cas. Co. of America, 166 Ohio St. 401, 142
N.E.2d 854 (1957); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Strauch, 179 Okla. 617, 67 P.2d 452 (1937). At
least one writer condemns this blending of pecuniary and penal interests as a subterfuge for
not admitting the problem which penal interests may involve. Morgan, supra note 11, at 475.
25. 60 Cal. 2d 868, 389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964). Spriggs involved a poico
officer's testimony upon cross-examination as to a declaration made by one of two people,
the declarant being unavailable, arrested for possession of narcotics when asked whethei
she owned the heroin involved. If her answer was in the affirmative it could have had a
material role in establishing the innocence of the appellant who was being tried for the
possession.
But it should be noted that if the declarant had stated that both she and the defendant
owned the heroin, that part of the testimony asserting the defendant's poss ,sion would not
be admissible, there being no circumstantial probability of trustworthiness to justify the
admission of such hearsay evidence. See Deike v. Great At]. & Pac. Tea Co., 3 Ariz. App.
430, 415 P.2d 145 (1966); Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 237 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1951) (in statement to police that defendant was the aggressor, declarant was building a
case for, and not against, her interest). See Note, supra note 3, at 954-55 for a discussion of
exculpatory and inculpatory declarations against penal interest.
26. Model Code of Evidence rule 509 (1942).
27. Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(10).
28. Proposed Fed. R. of Evidence 8-04(b) (4), 46 F.R.D. 378 (1969).
29. Model Code of Evidence rule 509 (1942).
30. Id.




eral Rules of Evidence, unlike the Model Code and Uniform Rules, necessitate
showing unavailability prior to the admission of such declarations. The reason
for this is that the Proposed Rules do not consider such declarations to be of
sufficient trustworthy "quality" to exclude this common law requirement for
exception to the hearsay rule.
Though adopted by three states32 and two territories,33 there is, as yet, ap-
parently no case law delineating the application of the Uniform Rule. Without a
requirement of unavailability, a witness may be selected to testify to the declara-
tion of another who is present and able to testify at the trial merely because the
witness could express the details of the declaration more vividly than the
declarant himself. Furthermore, the extension to declarations against social
interest may entail problems in application. The nature of social disapproval is
fluctuating, often subject to whim or fashion. It may be difficult, if not impos-
sible in many instances, to define and assert with as much clarity and reliability
as has been noted concerning pecuniary, proprietary, and penal interests-the
nature of the latter interests being defined objectively.34
While differing on application of this exception to the hearsay rule, the
Model Code, the Uniform Rules, and the Proposed Federal Rules concur that
declarations against penal interests should be admitted on a par with declara-
tions against pecuniary and proprietary interests.
Although prior to Brown, the New York courts had never expressly held that
declarations against penal interests did not constitute an exception to the
hearsay rule, such testimony had, in fact, been excluded.V 5 People v. Brown,
however, expressly rejected these precedents. In Brown, as in Spriggs, the court
did not restrict the admission of such declarations to special circumstances;
however, unlike Spriggs, Brown recognized the need for a finding of unavail-
ability, clarifying the permissible criteria therefore. The court noted that:
The rule in New York should be modernized to hold that an admission against penal
interest will be received where material and where the person making the admission is
dead, beyond the jurisdiction and thus not available; or where he is in court and
refuses to testify as to the fact of the admission on the ground of -elf incrimination 30
32. Cal. Evid. Code § 1230 (West 1966); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-460(j) (1964); N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2A:84A, Rule 63(10) (Supp. 1969).
33. Canal Zone, C.Z. Code tit. 5, § 2962(10) (1963); Virgin Islands, VI. Code, it. 5,
§ 932(10) (1967).
34. Cf. United States v. Dovico, 261 F. Supp. 862, 871-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aft'd,
380 F.2d 325 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 944 (1967).
35. See, e.g., People v. Bodah, 28 App. Div. 2d 744, 280 N.Y.S.2d 709 (3d Dep't 1967)
(mem.) (citing Greenfield v. People, 85 N.Y. 75 (1881)). See generally Richardson § 241.
36. 26 N.Y.2d at 94, 257 N.E.2d at 19, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 829. Two years prior to Brown
the appellate division admitted a declaration against pecuniary interest when the decarant
claimed a privilege against self-incrimination. Alexander Grant's Sons v. Phoenix Assurance
Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 93, 267 N.Y.S.2d 220 (4th Dep't 1966) (action on insurance policy for
defalcations, noting an expanded scope of unavailability for New York, which includes
illness, insanity, absence from the jurisdiction, and claiming the right of self-incrimination).
That court could not find any authoritative New York decision requiring that the unavail-
ability of the declarant be due exclusively to death. Id. at 95, 267 N?.Y.S.2d at 222-23, citing
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In Brown the court stated: "The ruling [of the trial court] was clearly proper
upon settled authority in this State. Thus the important question presented by
this appeal is whether the existing rule should be continued or abandoned in favor
of a more rational view of admissibility of declarations against interest."37 The
court noted "a gradual change of viewpoint which would abolish the distinc-
tion"38 between pecuniary and proprietary interests on the one band and penal
interest on the other, and opted for a break with the past.
After a brief discussion of the majority and the New York rule, the court,
quoting from Holmes' dissent in Donnelly and from Wigmore, concluded that
"the distinction which would authorize a court to receive proof that a man
admitted he never had title to an Elgin watch, but not to receive proof that he
had admitted striking Jones over the head with a club, assuming equal relevancy
of both statements, does not readily withstand analysis."30 The court reiterated
the holding of Spriggs that not only is a declaration against penal interest as
trustworthy as a declaration against pecuniary or proprietary interest, but, a
declaration against penal interest will also normally involve a pecuniary loss. 40
The lack of logic, precedent, and practicality in excluding declarations against
penal interest, while admitting declarations against pecuniary or proprietary
interest, was forcefully pointed out by Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent in
Donnelly.41 Holmes could find no prior Supreme Court case holding against the
Tompkins v. Fonda Glove Lining Co., 188 N.Y. 261, 264, 80 N.E. 933, 934 (1907). But see In
re Estate of Lopes, 41 Misc. 2d 326, 245 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sur. Ct. 1964). Death will suffice in
New York, see Kittredge v. Grannis, 244 N.Y. 168, 155 N.E. 88 (1926); Lyon v. Ricker, 141
N.Y. 225, 36 N.E. 189 (1894).
The broad approach to unavailability by both the appellate division and the court in the
instant case compels judicial discretion to determine on the facts whether unavailability exists
in the particular case. As a practical matter whether a declarant is dead, beyond the jurisdic-
tion, or in the courtroom but claiming immunity by his right against self-incrimination, he
is equally unavailable. New York is not alone in this wide scope approach to unavailability;
other courts have considered: insanity, Weber v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 175 Iowa 358, 151
N.W. 852 (1916); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 134 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Ctv.
App. 1939); as well as physical incapacity, Griffith v. Sauls, 77 Tex. 630, 14 S.W. 230
(1890) ; and the inability of a party to find a declarant, Pennsylvania R.R. v. Rochinskl, 158
F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir. 1946). See also 15 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 486 (1947).
37. 26 N.Y.2d at 91, 257 N.E.2d at 17, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 826. New York seems to have
insisted upon the following conditions for admission of evidence as a declaration against
interest: (1) The declarant must be aware that the declaration is against the pecuniary or
proprietary interests. Kittredge v. Grannis, 244 N.Y. 168, 155 N.E. 88 (1926). (2) The
declarant must be unavailable. For a discussion of the permissible grounds of unavailability
see note 36 supra. (3) The declarant must have no motive to falsify the facts. Alexander
Grant's Sons v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 93, 267 N.Y.S.2d 220 (4th Dep't
1966). (4) The declarant must have competent knowledge of the facts. Id. See generally
Fisch §§ 891-900; Mottla §§ 156-60; Richardson §§ 236-40.
38. 26 N.Y.2d at 92, 257 N.E.2d at 18, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
39. Id. at 91, 257 N.E.2d at 17, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
40. Id. at 92, 257 N.E.2d at 18, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 828. See People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868,
874-75, 389 P.2d 377, 381, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841, 845 (1964), See discussed in note 25 supra.
41. 288 U.S. at 277-78 (1913) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
admission of such a confession, and, disdaining those who would be manacled
by the precedent of English case law, remarked that "the rules of evidence in
the main are based on experience, logic and common sense, less hampered by his-
tory than some parts of the substantive law."-'' Furthermore, Wigmore ques-
tioned the authority of the Sussex Peerage case. In surveying the history of
declarations against interest, he noted that from 1800 to 1830 there was no
question in England but that the declarations against interest exception in-
cluded declarations against penal interest. He considered the Sussex decision to
be ill-conceived, as not in line with precedent, and he doubted whether the case
was still good law in England.
Despite occasional dictum and dissent to the contrary, the majority of courts,
until recently, had adhered to this "indefensible limitation" 44 by which monetary
interest was, in effect, thought to be more important to an individual than the
loss of his freedom, and therefore testimony jeopardizing the former was deemed
more reliable. Thus, as in Donnelly, if the unavailable declarant had confessed
to a debt, his declaration might well have been admitted, but since he was con-
fessing to murder the testimony was not considered to be trustworthy.
People v. Brown has cautiously extended the New York law dealing with
declarations against interest while not dismissing the need for, nor emasculating
the effectiveness of, the hearsay rule. Although the court has extended the scope
of declarations against interest, it has not stretched the exception as far as the
writers of the Uniform Rules, the Model Code, and the Proposed Federal Rules
would suggest. Furthermore, although the court clarified the grounds for un-
availability of the declarant, it did not, as both the Model Code and the Uniform
Rules appear to do, dispense with the need for unavailability. The court thus
preserves the right of cross-examination where it is at all possible, and where
it is not, admits evidence when it is clearly relevant and basically trustworthy.
Labor Law-Federal Court May Enjoin Strike in Breach of a No-Strike
Clause-Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson Overruled.-Petitioner, The Boys
Markets, and respondent, Local 770 of the Retail Clerks Union, were parties
to a collective bargaining agreement which provided for arbitration of all dis-
putes, and which contained a no-strike clause. During the term of the agree-
42. Id.
43. Wigmore §§ 1476-77. McCormick, likewise, is of the opinion that the cae is question-
able in light of precedent. McCormick § 255.
Wigmore maintains that "the truth is that any rule which hampers an honest man in
exonerating himself is a bad rule, even if it also hampers a villain in falsely passing for an
innocent." Wigmore § 1477, at 289. It is interesting to note that the 1899 Dreyfus cae might
not have had the same outcome had it refused to admit declarations against penal interest.
It was the confession of the unavailable guilty party which vindicated Dreyfus. A majority of
American courts at that time would not have permitted that confession to be admitted. Id. at
290.




ment, a labor dispute arose between the parties, and a strike was called by the
union. The petitioner sought a temporary restraining order in California
Superior Court and specific performance of the arbitration provision. The court
issued the restraining order, but the union had the case removed to the federal
district court and moved to have the restraining order quashed. The district
court denied respondent's motion, issued a permanent injunction and ordered
the parties to arbitrate.' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dis-
trict court,2 relying on Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson.8 The Supreme Court
reversed the Court of Appeals, overruling Sinclair. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
In the past, the Norris-LaGuardia Act was interpreted as severely limiting the
use of injunctions to curb the breach of no-strike agreements.4 The Act,' passed
in response to what was deemed by Congress to be the arbitrary use of the in-
junction by the federal courts as allies of management,0 provided that no federal
court could issue an injunction in a labor dispute, except in certain instances.7
An employer, however, still had recourse to the state courts for injunctive relief.8
With passage of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 19470 the
employer gained the additional remedy of a suit in federal court for breaches of
collective bargaining agreements, without the requirements of a minimal jurisdic-
tional amount or diversity of citizenship, and irrespective of the capacity of the
1. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 416 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir. 1969).
2. Id. at 370.
3. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
4. Id.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964) provides in pertinent part: "No court of the United States shall
have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction In any
case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons
participating or interested in such dispute ... from doing... any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employ-
ment .... 1
6. Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process: A Comment
on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 Yale L.J. 1547, 1553-55 (1963). See generally F. Frankfurter & N.
Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930).
7. The Act, in 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964), provides that an injunction may never be issued
against certain types of labor activity (e.g., strikes, peaceful assembly, the giving of publicity
in a labor dispute) and in 29 U.S.C. §§ 107-08 (1964) provides for the issuance of an In-
junction against any other type of labor activity only when it is found by testimony that
unlawful acts have been threatened which would cause such irreparable harm that the
petitioner would suffer more if the injunction were not granted than the respondent would
if the injunction were granted. The respondent must have made every reasonable effort to
resolve the dispute, including negotiation, voluntary arbitration or mediation. Petitioner must
also have no adequate remedy at law, and the public officers charged with protecting the
petitioner's property must be unable or unwilling to protect it. In addition, If an adequate
bond is posted, a temporary restraining order might be granted.
8. McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d
322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
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union to sue or be sued in the state court.10 Federal courts were divided over
the effect of this grant of jurisdiction, with some holding the grant merely pro-
cedural" and others holding that it authorized the federal courts to fashion a
body of substantive law.' 2 The Supreme Court resolved this conflict in Tectile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,13 by holding that Congress had authorized the
federal courts to fashion a body of federal law to implement national labor
policy.' 4 The Court in Lincoln Mils ordered specific performance of a promise
to arbitrate in order to implement the national labor policy favoring arbitra-
tion.15 The Court rejected the argument that the Norris-LaGuardia Act pre-
vented the issuance of an injunction, in the form of a specific performance order,
reasoning that failure to arbitrate was not one of the acts "which had given rise
to abuse of the power to enjoin."' 0
Subsequent to the decision in Lincoln Mills it was held that state courts could
assert jurisdiction in § 301 suits,' 7 but that federal law must be applied in such
suits.' 8 The result of these decisions was that either party could compel the
other to specifically perform an arbitration agreement, in either state or federal
court. However, the Norris-LaGuardia Act was designed to prevent injunctions
10. Id. This section provides in pertinent part: "Suits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting com-
merce. .. may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship
of the parties."
11. United Steelworkers v. Galland-Henning Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.), rev'd,
354 U.S. 906 (1957) (on the basis of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 US. 448
(1957)) ; ILGWU v. Jay-Ann Co., 228 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Mercury Oil Ref. Co. v. Oil
Workers Union, 187 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1951). See also Association of Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
12. Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec. Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957); Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 348 U.S. 437 (1955) ; United
Elec. Workers v. Oliver Corp, 205 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1953); Schatte v. International Alliance
of Theatrical Stage Employees, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950).
13. 353 US. 448 (1957).
14. Id. at 456.
15. Id. In granting specific performance, the Court rejected the lower court's decision,
which had relied on the common law rule that such a promise to arbitrate was not specifically
enforceable. See Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 230 F2d 81, 84 (Sth Cir. 19S6),
rev'd, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See also Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109
(1924).
16. 353 US. at 458. The Court noted that one of the purposes of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act was to promote arbitration. Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1964).
17. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 US. 502 (1962); see McCarroll v. Los
Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958); C.D. Perry & Sons v. Robilotto, 23 App. Div. 2d 949, 260
N.Y.S.2d 158 (3d Dep't 1965) (per curlam); Shaw Elec. Co. v. Local 98, IBEW, 418 Pa. 1,
208 A.2d 769 (1965).
18. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102 (1962).
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against strikes.10 If it were found that a strike could not be enjoined, the em-
ployer would find himself held to his promise to arbitrate, while unable to
enforce the union's promise not to strike.20 The lower federal courts were split on
this issue.21 Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson2 2 resolved this question, holding
that § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act prevented the issuance of such an injunc-
tion. The Court rejected the argument that, because it was in breach of a
contractual obligation, such a strike was not within the scope of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. The Court stated that the strike was clearly a "labor dispute"
within the meaning of the Act and that Congress had purposely made the scope
of the term "labor dispute" broad to prevent judicial narrowing. 23 Justice Black,
speaking for the Court, also rejected the argument that § 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act should be read together with § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, and that an accommodation of the two statutes should be
made,24 as had been done in Lincoln Mills and in Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men v. Chicago River & Indiana Railroad.25 Justice Black distinguished Sinclair
from Lincoln Mills on the grounds that while the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not
intended to prevent injunctions against failures to arbitrate, it was meant to pre-
vent injunctions against strikes.20 Sinclair was distinguished from Chicago River
19. In Lincoln Mills, the Court had differentiated between § 4 and non-§ 4 acts. 353 U.S.
at 458. In 29 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1964), the Congress had specifically stated that a federal court
could not enjoin a strike even if the procedural requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1964) were
met.
20. In Lincoln Mills, the Court referred to the arbitration clause as being the "quid pro
quo" for a no-strike clause. 353 U.S. at 455. See also 11 Loyola L. Rev. 326 (1963).
21. For a case holding that a federal court can issue an injunction see Teamsters Local
795 v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 282 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1960), rev'd, 370 U.S. 711
(1962). For cases holding that a federal court can not issue an injunction see All. Bull S.S.
Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958) ;
W.L. Mead, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 25, 217 F.2d 6 (lst Cir. 1954), petition for cert. dis-
missed, 352 U.S. 802 (1956).
22. 370 U.S. 195 (1962). In the companion case of Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S.
238 (1962), it was held that there was a cause of action against local and international
unions for damages for breach of the agreement not to strike. See generally Wellington &
Albert, supra note 6; The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 54, 205 (1962); 4
B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 206 (1962); 31 Fordham L. Rev. 592 (1963).
23. 370 U.S. at 200-03. A later New York case, C.D. Perry & Sons, Inc. v. Robilotto, 39
Misc. 2d 147, 240 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1963), aff'd, 23 App. Div. 2d 949, 260 N.Y.S.2d 158
(3d Dep't 1965) (per curiam) accepted the reasoning that a strike in violation of a no-strike
clause could be enjoined despite a statute which was the prototype of the Federal Norris-
LaGuardia Act, Ch. 477, [19351 N.Y. Laws 158th Sess. 1051, as amended Ch. 359, § 53
[1939] N.Y. Laws 162d Sess. 841; Ch. 837, [1961] N.Y. Laws 184th Sess. 2337 (now N.Y.
Labor Law § 807 (McKinney 1965)). See also Keene, The Supreme Court, Section 301 and
No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to Avco and Beyond, 15 Viii. L. Rev. 32, 49 (1969).
24. 370 U.S. at 209-12.
25. 353 U.S. 30 (1957). In that case, the Court allowed a strike injunction despite the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, because it found that the Congress in passing the Railway Labor
Act intended to provide for compulsory arbitration of minor disputes. Id. at 35-39. Presented
with the two statutes the Court reconciled them. Id. at 39-42.
26. 370 U.S. at 212. See 353 U.S. at 458.
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because the strike there was in violation of an express statutory duty to arbi-
trate2 7 which was part of an entire statutory scheme for the peaceful resolution of
railroad labor disputes.28 Finally, the Court rejected the argument that it should
modify the Norris-LaGuardia Act in order to promote arbitration, the "kingpin
of federal labor policy,"2 9 noting that such repeal was for "lawmakers, not law
interpreters." 30
In dissenting, Justice Brennan argued that both the Norris-LaGuardia Act
and § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act were involved in this case
and that there seemed to be a conflict between the two statutes. Therefore an ac-
commodation had to be made so that both statutory purposes could be achieved. 31
Noting the need for an injunction to curb the breach of a no-strike clause -3 2
and the previous adjustments made in Chicago River and Lincoln Mills, Justice
Brennan urged an adaptation of the two statutes33 "[C]ongressional rejection
of outright repeal [did not] imply hostility to an attempt by the courts to
accommodate all statutes pertinent ... ."4 Justice Brennan took the position
that in accommodating the Norris-LaGuardia Act's absolute ban on strike in-
junctions to the need for such injunctions in cases where no-strike agreements
have been breached the question was not one of repeal but of interpreting "the
whole statutory complex."3 5
The decision in Sinclair led to a disparity between state and federal remedies,
for in all but fourteen states an injunction could be issued against a strike in
breach of a no-strike clause.36 Yet the availability of this remedy was threatened
27. The Chicago River Court relied on 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1964), as amended (Supp. IV,
1968). 353 U.S. at 33-39.
28. 370 U.S. at 211. The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151-88 (1964), as amended 45
U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1968), established the National Railroad Adjustment Board under 45 U.S.C.
§ 153 (1964), as amended (Supp. IV, 1968), and the National Mediation Board under
45 U.S.C. § 154 (1964), as amended (Supp. IV, 1968). The purpose of the Adjustment
Board is the peaceful resolution of disputes growing out of the interpretation of existing
collective bargaining agreements. Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239, 24243
(1950). The jurisdiction of the Mediation Board is over disputes in the negotiation of con-
tracts. Cook v. Des Moines Union Ry., 16 F. Supp. 810, 813 (S.D. Iowa 1936). See Burstein,
The Injunctive Process, Symposium on Labor Relations Law 557, 561-62 (R. Slovenko ed.
1961).
29. 370 US. at 213.
30. Id. at 215.
31. Id. at 215-16.
32. In stating that the injunction was necessary, Justice Brennan offered little support
but noted that "Lilt is equally true in both cases that '[an injunction] alone can effectively
guard the plaintiff's right,' Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 773." Id. at 219. The entire
cited quote dealt not with a strike injunction but with an injunction against the use of union
funds in a political campaign, and the entire cited quote was: "courts should hesitate to fix
upon the injunctive remedy for breaches of duty owing under the labor laws unless that
remedy alone can effectively guard the plaintiff's right."
33. 370 U.S. at 216-20.
34. Id. at 220.
35. Id.
36. Keene, supra note 23, at 49. In fact, although there are 24 states with "little Norris-
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by the union's right of removal to a federal court3 7 This right to remove was
challenged on the grounds that the Norris-LaGuardia Act denied jurisdiction
to the federal courts where the sole relief requested was an injunction. 8
Because the circuits were in conflict on the question,89 the Supreme Court, in
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 73540 confronted the issue, and affirmed the Sixth
Circuit's decision4l that the federal courts did have jurisdiction. The Court rea-
soned that the claim was one "arising under the 'laws of the United States.' "42
The Court stated that "'lack of jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act,'
... meant only that the Federal District Court lacked the general equity power
to grant the particular relief."4
In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770,44 the Court overruled
Sinclair. Justice Brennan, who had written the dissent in Sinclair, delivered the
opinion of the Court.4 5 The Court rejected the argument that since Congress had
been urged to modify the Court's decision in Sinclair and had not elected to do
so, the principle of stare decisis should be applicable. 4 Justice Brennan reasoned
that stare decisis is but a "policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence," 47
and that Sinclair deviated from an otherwise consistent policy favoring arbitra-
tion. In light of Avco, Sinclair actually frustrated "realization of an important
goal of our national labor policy.1 48 Congressional silence, the Court added,
was no indication of approval of Sinclair. The Court stated that the effect of the
two decisions was "nothing less than to oust state courts of jurisdiction in
§ 301(a) suits where injunctive relief is sought for breach of a no-strike obliga-
tion,"149 while the intent of Congress in passing § 301(a) was to supplement
state jurisdiction, not to supplant it.r0 The Court also noted that while § 301 was
LaGuardia Acts," in 10 of them an injunction can be issued despite the statutes In certain
instances. Id.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1964) provides for such removal.
38. The challenge was found upon the statutory language: "No court of the United
States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order .... " 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
39. For a case holding that the district courts have jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 1441(b)
see Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
For a case holding that § 1441(b) does not give the district courts jurisdiction see American
Dredging Co. v. Operating Engineers Local 25, 338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 935 (1965).
40. 390 U.S. 557 (1968). See also Keene, supra note 23.
41. 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967).
42. 390 U.S. at 560, quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1964).
43. 390 U.S. at 561 (footnote omitted). The Court found it unnecessary to rule on the
holding in the court of appeals that the states were limited to federal remedies under § 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act, or on the question whether the federal court had to
dissolve the state court injunction. Id. at 560 n.2, 561 n.4.
44 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
45. Id. at 237.
46. Id. at 240-41.
47. Id. at 241.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 244.
50. Id. at 245.
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designed to produce uniformity of remedies in state and federal courts and the
right of removal was not designed to foreclose state relief but only to safeguard
federal rights, the effect of Sinclair and Avco was to produce an entirely
different result.6 1 The Court noted that although these difficulties could be alle-
viated by making Sinclair applicable to the states, Congress had dearly not
attempted that either in the Norris-LaGuardia Act or in § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act.5 2 The Court added that employers would be reluc-
tant to enter into the arbitration agreement "quid" because a breach of the
"quo"--a no-strike clause-could be remedied only by an action for damages,
which "is no substitute for an immediate halt" to the strike. 3
The Court accepted Justice Brennan's theory in his Sinclair dissent of accom-
modation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to later labor statutes.P The Court noted
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the later labor statutes were designed to
deal with different situations. While the Norris-LaGuardia Act was designed to
curb the federal courts' arbitrary use of the injunction, later statutes were de-
signed to promote "the peaceful resolution of industrial disputes,"35 in an era
when unions were far stronger than they had been when Congress had passed
the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932. Yet the "shift in emphasis [by Congress]
was accomplished ... without extensive revision of many of the older enactments,
including ... the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Thus it became the task of the courts to
accommodate, to reconcile the older statutes with the more recent ones."50 The
Court noted that while Sinclair undermined the effectiveness of arbitration, the
overruling of Sinclair would not undermine the central purposes of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.57
The Court limited its holding to the situation in which there was a mandatory
grievance or arbitration procedure in the collective bargaining agreement. 8 As
a guideline for the issuance of an injunction the Court stated that the district
court must have ordered arbitration before any injunction could be granted ' '
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Black, who spoke for the Court in Sinclair,
stated that he remained of the opinion that Sinclair was correctly decided.c°
He added that even if Sinclair had been incorrectly decided he would still dis-
sent because the making or changing of laws is primarily for Congress, especially
in the field of labor relations where such powerful and competing economic in-
terests are present.6 ' He noted that in Sinclair, Congress had been invited to
change the statute if it were displeased with the Court's interpretation, and that
51. Id. at 245.47.
52. Id. at 247, quoting McCarroll v. Los Angeles Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d
45, 63, 315 P.2d 322, 332 (1957), cert. denied, 355 US. 932 (1958).
53. 398 US. at 247-48.
54. Id. at 249.
55. Id. at 251.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 252-53.
58. Id. at 253.
59. Id. at 254.
60. Id. at 256.
61. Id. at 256-57.
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bills had been introduced to effect a change,02 but that Congress did not act and
therefore it would be inappropriate for the Court to "enact the amendment that
Congress has refused to adopt." 63 Justice Black viewed the doctrine of stare
decisis as being more than mere policy, and that in the ordinary case, precedent
should be followed because of considerations of certainty and equal treatment
of similarly situated litigants."
In overruling Sinclair, the Court was seeking to promote the desirability of
arbitration 5 and the enforcement of contracts 0 under § 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act by providing supplemental federal remedies for breach
of collective bargaining agreements in addition to those of the states. Certainly
the Court was correct in thinking that the absence of the injunctive power to
curb violation of no-strike clauses would make arbitration less desirable to the
employer, for the injunction is a more potent weapon than damages, in prevent-
ing strikes in breach of a no-strike agreement.07 In addition, the use of the
injunction to curb breaches of contract would do little harm to the basic pur-
poses of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which was designed to prevent federal courts,
acting as allies of management, from enjoining fledgling union activities.0 8
Similarly, the goal of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, which
is the enforceability of collective bargaining agreements, would be forwarded by
the availability of the injunction in federal courts. Section 301 was designed
to make suits by or against unions procedurally easier 0 and Sinclair and Avco's
effect was to eliminate the state court as a forum in suits to enjoin strikes in
violation of a no-strike clause.
In advancing these goals, however, the Court did not look at the necessity of
injunctive relief as opposed to damages and the effect that the availability of
62. Id. at 258. The text of these bills, introduced by Senator Javits and Representative
Reid, are contained in Dunau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 Va. L. Rev. 427, 464
n.100 (1969). On another occasion Secretary of Labor Schultz also suggested Inclusion of a
provision in new labor legislation to allow the use of the injunction, 1969 Labor Relations
Y.B. 541-42 (1970).
63. 398 U.S. at 259.
64. Id. at 257. Justice Black viewed stare decisis as being more important still when
a statute was involved because the "reinterpretation" of a statute is equivalent to a judicial
amendment of the statute, and only the Congress, which is responsive to the people, has the
power to amend a statute. Id. at 257-58.
65. See id. at 247-49. See also United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960) ; United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
66. See 398 U.S. at 247-49. See also Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502
(1962).
67. 398 U.S. at 248. Justice Black conceded as much: "The Court would have it that these
techniques are less effective than an injunction. That is doubtless true." Id. at 261.
68. See Keene, supra note 23, at 65-67; Kiernan, Availability of Injunctions Against
Breaches of No-Strike Agreements in Labor Contracts, 32 Albany L. Rev. 303, 304 (1968) ;
Wellington, The No-Strike Clause and the Labor Injunction: Time for a Re-Examination,
30 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 293, 294, 306-07 (1968).
69. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
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a court-ordered injunction may have on the unions' willingness to agree to arbi-
tration agreements. While an injunction is more effective than damages in pro-
viding relief, the difference is one of "expediency of remedy, rather than lack of
remedy."70 The goal of damages under § 301 is to return the injured party as
far as possible to the status quo. 1 In the past, the Supreme Court has held that
damages are a proper remedy for breach of a no-strike clause.72 While such
relief has been termed less effective than injunctive relief, it would appear that
the threat of a damage suit might be effective in discouraging a union from
striking.73 In addition, the Court did not consider the effect that the availability
of a court-ordered injunction might have on a union's desire to enter into an arbi-
tration agreement. Moreover, in allowing a federal court the injunctive power,
the Court failed to consider possible alternative remedies& 4 which might be more
acceptable to the unions and which, at least arguably, would not violate § 4
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.75
70. Edwards & Bergmann, The Legal and Practical Remedies Available to Employers to
Enforce a Contractual "No-Strike" Commitment, 21 Lab. L.J. 3, 21 (Jan. 1970).
71. See Mungin v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 416 F.2d 1169, 1177 (5th Cir. 1969). See 1963
ABA Labor Relations Section pt. II, at 237 (1964) where representatives of labor termed the
damage remedy "wholly adequate."
72. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bakery Workers Local 50, 370 U.S. 254 (1962); Atkinson v.
Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 US. 238 (1962). Damages awarded have included the loss of profits,
overhead costs and consequential damages due to loss of customers during the strike. W. L.
Mead, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 25, 129 F. Supp. 313 (D. Mass. 1955), afPd, 230 F.2d 576
(1st Cir.) appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 (1956). See Operating Engineers Local 653 v. Bay
City Erection Co., 300 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1962); United Elec. Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205
F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1953). See generally Edwards & Bergmann, supra note 70, at 9-11;
Fairweather, Employer Action and Options in Response to Strikes in Breach of Contract, 18
N.Y.U. Conf. on Labor 129, 149-55 (1966); Spelfogel, Enforcement of No-Strike Clause by
Injunction, Damage Action and Discipline, 17 Lab. L.J. 67, 77-79 (1966).
73. See Dunau, supra note 62, at 465. However, it must be noted that few damage suits
are actually brought, because the two partners, labor and management, must continue to
work together after a strike is ended. Fairweather, supra note 72, at 149. In addition, the
damage suit is made still more difficult because "the injury to the business cannot be mea-
sured accurately." Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 Rocky ML
L. Rev. 247, 255 (1958).
74. One alternative is that of arbitral injunctive relief. This remedy would be in the form
of an injunction by the arbitrator of the dispute against a strike in breach of a no-strike
clause. See Edwards & Bergmann, supra note 70, at 14-15; Fairweather, supra note 72, at
168-71. Such an injunction is not normally within an arbitrator's power. See Gulf & South
Am. S.S. Co. v. Maritime Union, 360 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1966); Aaron, The Strike and the
Injunction-Problems of Remand and Removal, 18 N.Y.U. Conf. on Labor 93, 102 (1966).
However, a properly drafted clause could give an arbitrator such power. See Spelfogel, supra
note 72, at 76. See generally Givens, Injunctive Enforcement of Arbitration Awards Pro-
hibiting Strikes, 17 Lab. L.J. 292 (1966).
75. In 1963 ABA Labor Relations Section pt. II, at 232-40 (1964), there was pointed
disagreement with the proposed resolution favoring overruling of Sinclair and legislation
to give the federal courts the injunctive power. The labor representatives put themselves on
record as opposing the granting of the injunctive power to the federal courts because of the
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It should also be noted that Boys Markets will change the unintended situa-
tion caused by Sinclair and Avco, where a state court injunction was effectively
denied an employer by the union's right of removal. The decision will also
bring the federal courts into conformity with the majority of the states which
allow injunctions against strikes in breach of a no-strike clause despite "little
Norris-LaGuardia Acts." 76 The decision will undoubtedly strengthen the arbitra-
tion clause in the collective bargaining agreement, and will make this clause
more desirable to employers. However, this will be accomplished at the cost
of a seeming judicial amendment. Although unions have traditionally favored
arbitration,77 the effect of this amendment may be to lessen the desirability of
arbitration to labor.
Warranty-Linitation of Actions-Personal Injury Action Against Manu-
facturer for Breach of Warranty Governed by Contract and Not Tort
Statute.-In 1965 plaintiff was injured when struck by a glass door manu-
factured by defendant glass company and installed in 1958 in the building
courts' lack of expertise in the labor field and because of the consequences of what are neces-
sarily hasty decisions by judges inexperienced in labor matters. The labor representatives
proposed arbitral injunctive relief as a more acceptable remedy to a problem that admittedly
existed. Id. at 237-39. Presumably the labor representatives' more favorable attitude towards
arbitration was due to the arbitrators' greater expertise. See also Givens, supra note 74, at 295.
The issuance of these injunctions against strikes by arbitrators has been upheld in two
recent post-Sinclair federal cases. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. ILA Local 1418, 389 F.2d 369
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968); Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. ILA Local
1291, 368 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 64 (1967). In both
cases, the court stated that an order would not run afoul of the Norris-LaGuarda Act
because the arbitration award had resolved the labor dispute in the agreed manner and an
injunction was therefore not an injunction in a labor dispute. 389 F.2d at 371-72; 368 F.2d
at 934. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 416 F.2d 368, 370 (9th Cir. 1969).
See also In re Ruppert, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1958). But see ILA
Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Maritime Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 77-79 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ; Spelfogel, supra note 72, at 76.
76. See Keene, supra note 23, at 49. A "little Norris-LaGuardia Act" is a state law which
prohibits the use of an injunction in a labor dispute in much the same way the federal law
does. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 31-113 (1958); N.Y. Labor Law § 807 (McKinney
1965); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 49.32.011, .050, .072 (1962). The language is often similar
to that of the federal law and often keeps the same distinction between § 4 and non-§ 4 acts.
Compare N.Y. Labor Law § 807(1)(f) (McKinney 1965) and Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 49.32.050 (1962), with 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964). Compare also N.Y. Labor Law § 807(1) (a)-
(e) (McKinney 1965) and Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 49.32.072 (1962), with 29 U.S.C. § 107
(1964).
77. See, e.g., R. Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process 2-3 (1965); P. Hays, Labor
Arbitration: A Dissenting View 1-30 (1966); Jones & Smith, Management and Labor Ap-
praisals and Criticisms of the Arbitration Process: A Report with Comments, 62 Mich.
L. Rev. 1115, 1117 (1964). See also Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process: 1943-1963, 52
Ky. L.J. 817, 832 (1964).
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occupied by defendant buyer. In 1967 plaintiff brought an action for personal
injuries against defendant manufacturer 1 alleging a breach of implied warranty
of fitness for a particular use. 2 The supreme court at special term granted de-
fendant's motion to dismiss the causes of action for breach of warranty for the
reason that the six-year statute of limitations had expired.3 The appellate divi-
sion unanimously affirmed this determination without opinion. 4 On appeal, the
court of appeals affirmed in a 4-3 decision, holding that, since the action involved
was one for personal injuries arising from breach of warranty, it was essentially
a contract action and therefore the applicable statute of limitations was six years
from the time of sale5 rather than three years from the time of injury as would
be the case in a tort action.6 Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d
340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
The slow, cautious, and often circuitous development of the law of products
liability is illustrative of the history of the common law itself.7 Originally the
harsh rule of caveat emptor was the generally accepted doctrine.8 The dominance
of this principle began to diminish when it was recognized that a supplier of
chattels was "under a duty to exercise the care of a reasonable man of ordinary
prudence to see that the goods do no harm to the buyer."O Although the action
1. Plaintiff also sued Central Trust Company, the owner of the building, but the breach
of warranty actions were dismissed and no appeal was made. Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 342, 253 N.E.2d 207, 208, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 491 (1969).
2. Plaintiff also brought a negligence action but this appeal dealt only with breach of
warranty. Id.
3. Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 57 Misc. 2d 45, 291 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Sup. CL 1967).
4. Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 29 App. Div. 2d 918, 290 N.YS.2d 186 (4th
Dep't 1968) (mere.).
S. N.Y. Civ. Prac. § 213(2) (McKinney 1963).
6. Id. § 214(5).
7. See, e.g., E. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 7 (1949); W. Pro--er, Torts
§ 95, at 648 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Prosser]; Ehrenzweig, Products Liability
in the Conflict of Laws-Toward a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under "Foreseeable and
Insurable Laws": 11, 69 Yale LJ. 794 (1960); Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 Fordhan
L. Rev. 1, 8 (1941).
8. See, e.g., Miller v. Tiffany, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 298, 309 (1863); Hargous v. Stone, 5 N.Y.
73, 82 (1851). As early as the 13th century an exception to this doctrine was made with re-
gard to food and drink. Selden Society, Leet jurisdiction in the City of Norwich 16, 70, 72
(W. Hudson ed. 1892); Selden Society, The Court Baron 50, 80, 88, 111 (F. Maitland &
W. Baildon eds. 1891); Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 Yale L.J. 1133,
1142-43 (1931); Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 Yale LJ. 1099, 1103 (1960) [hereinafter cited as The Assault upon the Citadel]; Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment b at 348 (1965).
9. Prosser § 95, at 648; see The Assault upon the Citadel at 1099. The courts first turned
away from the harsh doctrine of caveat emptor and recognized the duty of reasonable care
in the so-called "public" callings, typical of which was the "common carrier" See Dickson
v. Clifton, 95 Eng. Rep. 834 (K.B. 1766); Dale v. Hall, 95 Eng. Rep. 619 (KLB. 1750);
Prosser § 28, at 142. See generally Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings,
75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 411 (1927).
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sounded in tort,' ° the duty of reasonable care was considered to arise from a
contractual relationship between the supplier of the chattel and the injured
buyer." As a result, while this concept of liability was still evolving, the courts
began to find liability for "deceit" and "fraud" and to speak of the requirement
of "privity."'1 2 The use of this language created an intermingling of tort and
contract which gave birth to a new concept-that of "warranty.XU Warranty
cases were based on tort14 until 1778 when it was held that such an action
properly sounded in contract. 15
In 1842 the case of Winterbottom v. Wright,' in keeping with precedent,"
held that there could be no action based on warranty where there was no privity
of contract.' However, the opinion was construed to mean that there could be
no product liability under any theory unless the requirement of privity was
satisfied.' 9
During the following years "a remarkable variety of highly ingenious and
equally unconvincing theories" were used to develop exceptions to the general
rule requiring privity.20 As the number of exceptions recognized by the courts
10. Prosser § 95, at 651; Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1888)
[hereinafter cited as The History of Assumpsit]; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufac-
turers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers];
Note, Necessity for Privity of Contract in Warranties by Representation, 42 Harv. L. Rev.
414 (1929).
11. Boorman v. Brown, 114 Eng. Rep. 603, 609 (Ex. 1842); Prosser § 95, at 648; Poul-
ton, Tort or Contract, 82 L.Q. Rev. 346, 351 (1966). See also W. Prosser, Selected Topics
on the Law of Torts 381 (1953).
12. See, e.g., Pasley v. Freeman, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1789); History of Assumpsit
at 8.
13. E.g., Levy v. Langridge, 150 Eng. Rep. 1458 (Ex. 1838). "[Wlarranty is a curious
hybrid, born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract, unique in the law." Prosser § 95,
at 651 (footnote omitted). "A more notable example of legal miscegenation could hardly be
cited than that which produced the modem action for breach of warranty. Originally sound-
ing in tort, yet arising out of the warrantor's consent to be bound, it later ceased necessarily
to be consensual and at the same time came to lie mainly in contract." Note, Necessity for
Privity of Contract in Warranties by Representation, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 414-15 (1929)
(footnotes omitted).
14. See, e.g., Chandelor v. Lopus, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (Ex. 1607); History of Assumpslt at 8.
15. Stuart v. Wilkins, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778).
16. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
17. E.g., Levy v. Langridge, 150 Eng. Rep. 1458 (Ex. 1838); Pasley v. Freeman, 100
Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1789).
18. 152 Eng. Rep. at 402.
19. See, e.g., Hudson v. Moonier, 94 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1938); Hanson v. Blackwell
Motor Co., 143 Wash. 547, 255 P. 939 (1927). This interpretation has since been considered
to be incorrect. See 1943 N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 65(J); Prosser § 96, at 658-59; Bohlen,
Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees, 45 L.Q. Rev.
343 (1929). The source of the difficulty was apparently dictum to the effect that "Unless we
confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the
most absurd and outrageous consequences ... would ensue." 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
20. Prosser § 97, at 678 (footnote omitted) ; The Assault upon the Citadel at 1124. These
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continued to grow the rule was gradually narrowed until, in 1916, the case of
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.& 2 signaled an end to privity as a necessary ele-
ment in product liability actions based on negligence.22
Contractual privity remained a requirement, however, in actions based on a
warranty theory23 until 1960 when Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.2 4
struck the death blow to the "citadel of privity."2' Henningsen opened the door
to a third theory of recovery-that of "strict liability, without negligence and
without privity, as to the manufacturers of all types of products ... . - This
new concept was expressly adopted by California in 1963 when the court in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.27 rejected contractual limitations and
held that "the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties
but by the law of strict liability in tort-"-s This theory was incorporated by the
American Law Institute in the second Restatement of Torts- O and has been
accepted by a growing number of courts.aO The doctrine has been acclaimed as
theories consisted, for the most part, of variations on the principles of agency, assignments,
and third party beneficiaries. For a collection of twenty-nine theories and the cases in which
they were used see Gilla, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 Ore. L. Rev. 119, 153-55
(1957).
21. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
22. "There is nothing anomalous in a rule which imposes upon A, who has contracted
with B, a duty to C and D and others according as he knows or does not know that the
subject-matter of the contract is intended for their use." Id. at 393, 111 N.E. at 1054. See
generally The Assault upon the Citadel.
23. This requirement was also narrowed as the courts developed exceptions to the rule.
In Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927) the court accepted
the theory of an implied warranty running from the supplier of food and drink to the ulti-
mate consumer. The limitation of this exception to food products was ended in 195S when it
was extended to building materials in Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply,
Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958). Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12
P.2d 409 (1932) held that where a defendant has made a positive assertion upon which the
plaintiff has relied there exists an express warranty providing a basis of recovery irrespective
of privity.
24. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
25. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn. L. Rev.
791 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Fall of the Citadel]. At the heart of the Henningsen opinion
was the statement by the court that: "[Olf tremendous significance in a rapidly expanding
commercial society was the recognition of the right to recover damages on account of per-
sonal injuries arising from a breach of warranty. The particular importance of this advance
resides in the fact that under such circumstances strict liability is imposed upon the maker
or seller of the product. Recovery of damages does not depend upon proof of negligence or
knowledge of the defecL" 32 NJ. at 372, 161 A.2d at 77 (citations omitted).
26. Fall of the Citadel at 794.
27. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
28. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (emphasis added).
29. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
30. See, e.g., Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (D.C. Mun. CL
App. 1962) ; Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963) ; Morrow v. Caloric
Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963); Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wash. 2d 347,
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dispelling some of the fog and confusion which resulted from the development
of previous product liability theories81 in the "borderland of tort and con-
tract."32
The issue in Mendel centered around the question of whether a personal in-
jury action for breach of warranty sounds in tort or contract. In reaching its
decision, the court was faced with the dilemma of relying on one of two ap-
parently inconsistent New York cases: Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp.3
and Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.34 The Goldberg case, in 1963, re-
inforced the trend in recent New York decisions 5 that privity of contract is no
longer necessary in an action for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose.36 The decision further indicated that " [a ] breach of war-
ranty, it is now clear, is not only a violation of the sales contract out of which
the warranty arises but is a tortious wrong suable by a noncontracting party
whose use of the warranted article is within the reasonable contemplation of the
vendor or manufacturer.137 Citing Greenman with approval the court said that
"strict tort liability" was "surely a more accurate phrase" to define the liability
of a supplier of chattels to a party injured by the chattels38 This decision had
been interpreted as placing New York among those states leading the strong
trend in favor of the doctrine of strict tort liability.8 9
The Mendel court, however, chose to rely on the earlier decision in Blessing-
ton, which held that the six-year contract statute of limitations was applicable
in an action for personal injuries arising out of a breach of an implied war-
ranty.40 The Mendel opinion dismissed the implications in Goldberg rather
378 P.2d 298 (1963). For an extensive listing see Prosser § 97, at 677-78 and cases cited
therein.
31. See, e.g., Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has The Tocsin Sounded?, 1 Duquesno L. Rev.
1 (1963); The Fall of the Citadel; Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers. Contra, Strict
Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products--An Opposing View,
24 Tenn. L. Rev. 938 (1957).
32. W. Prosser, Selected Topics on the Law of Torts 452 (1953).
33. 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
34. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
35. See, e.g., Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 NE.2d
399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213
N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
36. 12 N.Y.2d at 435-36, 191 N.E.2d at 82, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
37. Id. at 436, 191 N.E.2d at 82,240 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
38. Id. at 437, 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
39. E.g., Prosser § 97, at 675 n.64, 677 n.5; Noel, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 50
A.B.A.J. 446, 448 (1964); Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers at 12 nA4; Witherspoon,
Torts or Warranties?, 73 Com. L.J. 134, 138-39 (1968); cf. 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman,
Products Liability § 16A[3], at 3-186 n.15 (1966).
40. 305 N.Y. at 147, 111 N.E.2d at 422-23. Blessington involved a warranty of fitness
action against a store for selling inflammable children's clothing. The plaintiff's causes of
action in negligence were barred by the Statute of Limitations and It was only by construing
warranty as contract that the court was not obliged to dismiss the case.
cursorily: ccWie there is language in the majority opinion in Goldberg ap-
proving of the phrase 'strict tort liability', it is clear that Goldberg stands for
the proposition that notwithstanding the absence of privity, the cause of action
which exists in favor of third-party strangers to the contract is an action for
breach of implied warranty."" Thus, by relying on Blessington, the court re-
versed the trend toward the strict liability doctrine suggested in Goldberg.
The court considered the possibility of overruling Blessington, and estab-
lishing a three-year statute of limitations period commencing at the time of the
injury for all personal injury actions.4 But it declined to do so because a con-
flict would result with the four-year provision in Article Two of the Uniform
Commercial Code adopted by New York.43 This four-year period 4 starts run-
ning for a breach of warranty upon tender of delivery,5 and there is no require-
ment of privity for a breach of warranty action if the injured person40 is a
member of the buyer's family or household or a guest in his home.' 7 Thus it
would be possible for a plaintiff not in privity but, for example, a guest in the
buyer's home
to pick and choose between the code's four-year-from-the-time-of-the-cale, and [the
proposed] three-year-from-the-time-of-the-injury, limitations period, depending upon
which .. . would grant [him] the longest period of time to sue.... [I]t would be
absurd to have two different periods of limitation applicable to the same cause of
action, with the same elements of proof, complaining of the very same wrong.48
The majority concluded by indicating its willingness to sacrifice the small num-
ber of meritorious claims which are not brought promptly, in order to protect
manufacturers from unfounded suits filed many years after a product has been
sold.4 9
Judge Breitel, in his dissent, began with the conclusion that "it is all but
unthinkable that a person should be time-barred from prosecuting a cause of
action before he ever had one."50 He attacked the majority's policy considera-
tion that a manufacturer should not be subject to a breach of warranty action
41. 25 N.Y.2d at 343-44, 253 N.E.2d at 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
42. Id. at 344,253 N.E2d at 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
43. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725 (McKinney 1964). Mendel is not governed by the UCC since the
sale took place in 1958 and the UCC became effective in 1964. 25 N.Y.2d at 342 n.L, 253
NYB.2d at 208 n.1, 305 N.YS.2d at 492 n.1.
44. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (McKinney 1964).
45. Id. § 2-725(2).
46. Personal injury is listed as one of the consequential damages for which a plaintiff
may sue upon a breach by the seller. Id. § 2-715(2) (b).
47. Id. § 2-318.
48. 25 N.Y.2dat 345, 253 N.E2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494-95.
49. Id. at 346, 253 N.E2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
50. Id., 253 N.E.2d at 211, 305 N.YS.2d at 495 (dissenting opinion). The Supplementary
Practice Commentary to N.Y. Civ. Prac. § 214 (McKinney Supp. 1970) specifically dis-
approves of the possibility of a plaintiff being barred before he is injured.
1970] CASE NOTES
158 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
for personal injuries many years after the breach for "that is precisely the pos-
sibility" in a negligence action.5'
Judge Breitel emphasized the tortious nature of a strict liability action and
pointed out that the Goldberg decision indicated an acceptance of this doctrine
in New York.5 2 He dismissed the majority's arguments concerning the UCC as
"all but irrelevant to the problem at hand.15 3 The UCC, according to Breitel,
reflects thinking which is not up to date with that in tort law; furthermore, it
was not intended to provide an exclusive remedy but is confined to contract
warranty in the narrow sense of that term."r
Judge Breitel's conclusion was "that contract or warranty thinking in the
area of strict product liability is no longer permissible .... Statutes of Limita-
tions do not bar nonaccrued causes of action ... ."0 If such a statute is neces-
sary, the legislature should enact one and it has not done so in the tort area. 0
Although the court did note that the provisions of the UCC were not con-
trolling,5 7 the majority, nevertheless, relied on the UCC as an expression of
legislative policy. This reliance seems to have been misplaced. There does not
appear to be any evidence of legislative intent showing that the UCC was to act
as an impediment to the evolving body of case law concerned with consumer
protection, rather, the indications seem to show the contrary 8
The court endeavored to reach a solution which would adequately protect the
manufacturer from suits instituted a prolonged period of time after their
products entered the stream of commerce. It is possible that had the court
focused on its own initial inquiry-is warranty an action in contract or tort-a
substantial amount of confusion may have been avoided. The majority, rather
than clarifying this issue, deemed it necessary to base its opinion on policy rea-
sons, weighing such factors as difficulty of proof.50 Such factors, it is assumed,
were considered when the legislature established the various time limitations for
51. 25 N.Y.2d at 347, 253 N.E.2d at 211, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
52. Id. at 348, 253 N.E.2d at 212, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 497. Since the Goldberg decision, the
text writers have included New York among the states adhering to the "strict tort liability"
doctrine. See note 39 supra. Furthermore, the American Law Institute has recognized that
the strict liability doctrine does not sound in contract, but is "purely one of tort." Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment m at 355 (1965).
53. 25 N.Y.2d at 351, 253 N.E.2d at 214, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
54. Id. at 351-52, 253 N.E.2d at 214, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 500. Uniform Commercial Code
§ 2-318, Comment 3 states that the code is neutral with respect to expansion of warranty
protection to persons beyond those enumerated in the code.
55. Id. at 353, 253 N.E.2d at 215, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 345, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494. The sale was consummated in
1958. Id. at 342 n.1, 253 N.E.2d at 208 n.1, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 492 n.1. The UCC only applies
to "transactions" and "events" after September 27, 1964. N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 2-725(4),
10-101 to -105 (McKinney 1964), as amended (McKinney Supp. 1970).
58. Cf. N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 1-103, 2-318, Comment 3 (McKinney 1964). See algo Titus,
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 Stan.
L. Rev. 713, 758 (1970).
59. 25 N.Y.2d at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
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instituting different causes of action.60 The court should have determined
whether the action was tort or contract and then applied the appropriate statute
of limitations as found in the Civil Practice Law and Rules 1 thus avoiding any
possible usurpation of a legislative function.
In attempting to rationalize its conclusion the court was faced with an ap-
parent obstacle. Appellant argued that the action was really based on the theory
of strict tort liability akin to that delineated in section 402A of the Restatement
of Torts62 which was considered to have been substantially adopted by New
York in Goldberg.s Thus the appellant argued that the action must sound in
tort. The court of appeals, however, dismissed plaintiff's argument by explaining
that Goldberg did not establish strict tort liability as an independent cause of
action in New York but rather stands for the proposition that in suits brought
on warranty by a contemplated user against the manufacturer privity is no
longer necessary.P There does not seem to be any other reasonable interpreta-
tion of the court's treatment of Goldberg than that strict tort liability merely
eliminates a requirement of privity in warranty actions. Thus, the court ap-
parently held that strict tort liability in New York is a doctrine of contractual
law and not a tort action.65 Such an interpretation of Goldberg contains a cer-
tain definitional inconsistency and most definitely flies in the face of the majority
of the commentators. 68
Even assuming that a judicial exercise in public policy is a valid approach to
a determination of the applicable statute of limitations, has the court arrived at
a desirable answer? The decision reached gives rise to the anomoly that an
injured party may be barred from a recovery before there was an injury.G7 The
underlying choice in Mendel was which of two conflicting public policies to
favor-protection against defending claims filed after an unreasonable delay, or
protection from injury resulting from the introduction of defective products into
60. See, e.g., 1958 Legis. Doc. No. 13, at 43-86; 1962 Legis. Doc. No. 8.
61. N.Y. Civ. Prac. art. 2 (McKinney 1963).
62. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). For recent treatments of the inter-
relationship of warranty and strict tort liability see Titus, supra note 58; Tobin, Products
Liability: Recovery of Economic Loss?, 4 NZ..U.L. Rev. 36 (1970); Note, Statutes of
Limitations: Their Selection and Application in Products Liability Cases, 23 Vand. L. Rev.
775 (1970). Compare Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965), with Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) for
divergent treatment of recoverable damages.
63. See authorities cited note 39 supra.
64. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
65. The majority's opinion would then seem to stand as an exception to Dean Prosser's
statement that "No one doubts that, in the absence of privity, the liability must be in tort
and not in contract." Prosser § 97, at 681.
66. See note 39 supra and text accompanying notes 37-39. See also Guarino v. Mine
Safety Appliances Co., 31 App. Div. 2d 255, 258-9, 297 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642-43 (2d Dep't), aIPd,
25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1969).
67. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. § 214, Supplementary Practice Commentary at 75 (McKinney
Supp. 1970). See also 25 N.Y.2d at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495 (Breitel, J.,
dissenting).
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the marketplace. The election by the court of the former would seem to repre-
sent a retrogression from the trend of modem legal thought in this area.08
The possible effect of this decision on the law of products liability in New
York is undesirable. A plaintiff who is injured by a defective product after the
statute of limitations for contract actions has run is barred from a claim based
on implied warranty, yet he will probably be precluded from pursuing a claim
based on strict tort liability since the validity of this cause of action is now
doubtful under the court's interpretation of Goldberg. This may leave the injured
party with recourse only to a cause of action in negligence dissipating for such
plaintiff the benefits derived from the extensive modern developments in the
field of products liability.
68. See Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: the Road to and Past
Vandermark, 38 S. Cal. L. Rev. 30, 46-47 (1965); Fall of the Citadel at 794-98; Strict Tort
Liability of Manufacturers.
